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The purpose of thi~ thesis was to gain an understanding of the formation and 
irnpiementmion of the ohjectives of the Mci!icare Fee Schedule as set forth in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1989 and i990. 
The research for this thesis was 311;:>roached by employing the methodology suggeslL:d 
by the institutional and resource dependency theories of organizational behavior. Archival 
research was the primMY technique used to obtain data describing behavioral and fiscal 
trends associatcri with fvkdicare Part B alld lhe Medicare Fet: Schedule. Analytic and 
empirical research technioues were also aplJl ieci to facili tate identification of organizations 
active in the reform environmenl. Rcscuch tinciings were lI sed to construct the model of 
the Department of Health and Human Services orgAniZAtional environment on which the 
analysis was based. 
Findings include: a) a fragmented prc-refonn organizational environment, b) general 
consensus regarding the concept ot physicia n payment reform among the Department of 
Health and Human Services and organil.atili~lS active in the environment, e) disagreement 
and coali tion building in the organi zational environment in response to the Depanmcnt of 
Jkalth and Human Services proposed rule and d) effective pressure group politics by 
special interest groups in gaining the congressional supJXlrl needed to convince the reform 
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This thesis examines the objectives of the Medicare Fcc Schedu le (M:FS) as set forth 
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of )989 (OBRA 89) and amended by the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (ORM 90) and the incentive stnlCture created to achieve those 
objectives. In addition to a review of quantitative measures ofprograrn performance. this 
work also considers program objectives and achievements from the perspectives of 
institutional (SCOlt, 1987, pp. 493-511) and resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
theories of organizations 
2. Methodology 
With the intent of putting the changes effected by these Acts into historical context, 
this chapter includes a brief ex,nnination of the organizational environment preceding 
Medicare physician payment reform Followi ng this discussion of the pre-reform 
environment, Chapter II presents an introduction to t hc salient features of the physician 
payment reform. It focuses on program mechanisms incorporated in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1')<)0 The three 
major mechanisms of physician payment reform and their key subcomponents arc presented 
within the context of their intended effect. Interrelationships between the mechanisms are 
identified and the significance of the interdependencies addressed 
The scope of the examination is narrowed in Chapter III so that the Medicare Fee 
Schedule (MFS), the manner in which the fee schedule is intluenced by Medicare Volume 
Perfonnance Standards (MVPS), and the effects of political intluellce may be considered from 
an organizational control system perspective. 1-10dels are developed to gain an 
understanding of the manner in which the effects of major actors, the environment, and the 
administrative control mechanisms required by legislation and regulation interacted to 
influence change in the structure ofthe medical industry 
Chapter JV considers the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
llnvirolUllent. Organizations active in the physician payment reform process are idcntified and 
a model oflhe organizational environment is constructed 
In Chapter V, selected changes to the program prior to the implementation of 
physician payment reform in 19<)2 are analY7..cd using the framework provided by the 
organizational behavior models. Emphasis is placed on the rea(;tion of the environment 10 the 
details promulgated in the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) published by the 
Department ofHcalth and Human Services (DHHS) on June 5,1991 
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes significant program events and compares events 
relative to the outcomes suggested by the models presented in Chapter IV, Anticipated and 
unanticipated outcomes are examined and conclusions drawn concerning the utility of 
institutional and resource dependency models as tools for analyzing physician payment 
reform 
B. TnE Mf,DlCARE ENVIRONMENT, 1965-1989 
In order to understand the significa nce of the physiciiln payment reform effort and the 
manner in which it was executed. it is necessary to examine the environment that prompted 
its undertaki ng, Program history, scope. and operational performance measures are used to 
establish the setting in which reform took place 
1. Enllctment of the Medicare l'rogram 
The Medicare Program, embodied in Public Law 89-97. was signed into law on July 
30, 1965 by President Lyndon Johnson, Implemented on July 1, 1966, it was originally 
inten ded to increase access to health care for the nation's elderly, primarily by providing a 
degree ortinancial rclieffrom the burden of tire cost of care, The organi;o:atio nal structure tlrat 
was adopted to achieve th is objective divided program administration into two major 
subdivisions, Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B 
2. Major Medicare Components 
Mel/iwre ParI A 
Medicare Part A. the Hospital InSUflmce (I-H) program, was intended to cover 
those services provided by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities (SNF) and some care provided 
by horne health agencies_ A Hospital insnrance (HI) Trust Fund was establi shed and funded 
by: a) payroll taxes, b) transfers from the Rai lroad Retil-ement Account, c) transfers ti-om 
Railroad U ninsured Persons, d) reimhursement for voluntary enrollees, e) payments fo r 
military wage credits and t) intercst on trust fund investments_ Historically, the dorninant 
source of income for the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fllnd has been the payroll tax 
Beginning with the introduction of the prograrn in t9(;7, the portion of inc orne contribut ed 
by payroll taxes has remained relatively steady al approximately 90 percent of all program 
A summary oftotal lfllst fu nd rcvenue levels is provided in Figure I 
llecause Ihe Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund receives no payments from 
the Treasury general fund, it must consider the balance between program disbursements and 
income as it provides its services. It is a result of these accounting mechanisms that makes 
it possible to talk about the concept of Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund positive balances 
and bankruptcy 
~ledir:are Part LJ 
Medicare Part B, also known as the Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMJ) 
program. was intended as a complement to the Hospital Insurance program. Pan B 
addresses Ihe provision of physician services for ambulatory care. durable medical equipment 
(DME), and lilnited home health agency care, There arc three sources of funding for 
Medicare Pan B: a) insurance premiums paid by program participants, b) interest and other 
income and e) government contributions from the general u11ld 
Insurance premiums, originally intended in 1967 to cover 50 percent of Pan 
B costs, currently provide for approximately 25 percent of program requirements 
Specifically, in 1992 premiums amounted to $12,748 million, which was approximately 23.99 
percent of total Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund income (Health Care 
Financing Administration, 1994, p. 35), Unless othenvise noted, all monetary values are 
presented in nominal dollars. Intcrest and other income is described by thc Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) as consisting of recoveries of amounts borrowed from the 
trus t [ll11d "which are not obligations of the trust fimd and other miscellaneous incomc" 
(Health Care Financing Administration, 1994, p 35)_ In 1992 this source comprised 
approximately 3_2] percent of trust fund revenue The third and final source oftruSI fillld 
income is received from government contributions. This source provides the balance of 
nmding required to support lhe Supplcmentary Medical Insurance (5MI) program. In 1992 
government contributions amounted to $]8,684 million which constitutes approximately 
74.97 percent of program requirements (Health Care Financing Administration, 1994, p. 35) 
A summary of Supplement"'ry Medical Insurance (SMI) income by revenue category is 
provided in Figure 2 
Unlike the Hospital Insurance (I--Il) Trust Fund, the Supplementary Medical 
Insurance (SM1) Trust Fund does have a direct channel to the Treasury general fund . By 
design, it is this income channel from the Treasury th"'t covers the cost of care not provided 
by participant premiums, deductibles lind program investments. Because of this revenuc 
structure, the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund docs not face the 
bankruptcy issues currently being contemplated by the Ho.'pita] Insurance (HI) Tnlst Fund 
trustees_ However, tlie concepts of surplus and deficit spending still can be used when 
evaluating its firl1lncial performance 
3. Trends Anecting Medicare Pari B 
The trends and sOl11e of the external pressllres that program administrators were being 
subjccted to during this period are discllssed below to provide a more complete description 
of the enviromnent in which these decision makers were firnctioning prior to the initiation of 
reform 
Recognition of t/le Need to Act 
During the late ~ixties and early seventies, the relatively greater volume of 
expenditures and rapid growth taking place in Medicare Pan A may have caused it to take 
precedence over concern for the events and trends that were transpiring in Part B. As seen 
in Figure 3, in terms of outlays Part A was and remains a much larger program than Part B, 
which may explain why Part A was subject to more immediate attention and review, Also, 
the enrollment in Medicare Part A and Part B have remained approximately the same cven 
though the expenditures for Pmt A have increased more rapidly than the expendi tures for Part 
B. For example. in 1975 the number of Hospital Insurance (HI) enrollees totaled 24,6 million, 
while for the same period Supplementary Medical ln~urance (SMI) enrollment totaled 23.9 
mill ion, a diftcrence of only 2,85 percen\. As indicmed by the level of legislative activity, even 
though during this period SOllle controls on the grO\\1h in expenditun::s for physician services 
in Part B were attempted in 1971 by the Nixon administration, the majority of attention 
remained tixed on Part A 
A source for reform of Part A was the Social Security Amendments of 198) 
(public Law 98-21). As a result of these amendments Medicare changed the way hospitals 
were paid for their services. Before the amendments were enacted, under the traditional 
"reasonable cost basis," there wcre no effective mechanisms in pl,lce for controlling the 
volume or intensity of care. The retrospective fashion in which hospitals were being 
reimbursed seemed to encourage le~s than optimal uti lization of resources when treat ing a 
patient. (Congressional [Judget Office, 1086, p. xv) This methodology provided an incentive 
for conservative practices such as redundilnt laborato!), testing, over testing in order to 
minimize liability, and prolongt:d admission periods The results of pradices of this nature 
were higher overall costs. (Moon, 1986, p. 331) 
The reasonable cost basis approilch WilS rcplaced by tht: Prospt:ctivt: Payment 
System (PPS), bcginning October 10. 1983. Under the Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
hospitals were compensilted using rates that were determined in advance of treatment 
Specifically, a fixed amount per case was pllid bllsed upon the type of ca~c or "diagnosis-
re1att:d group (DRG) into which the case was cla~sified"(Way~ and Means Committee of the 
House of Representatives, US . Congrcss [hencetorth, Ways and Means l. 1994, p. 131) 
Under the Prospective Payment System (PPS), the more cost effective a hospital became ilnd 
the lower its riltes fell below the Prospective Payment System (PPS) predetennined allowable 
cost. the greater its profit margin 
The incentive to increase profits by increasing efficiency appears to have been 
communicated to hospital administrators, and in general the Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) wa~ viewed as a success by program administrators. (Moon, 1993, p. 60) Success, in 
this context. was measured "not in absolute dollars, but in terms of what Medicare wou ld 
otherwise have had to pay for care"(Moon, j99J, p GO) Apparently convinced that the 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) was having the desired effect. attention began to shift to 
the next most significant demand on Medicare resources, l\Iedicare Pan B. specifically the 
rate of growth in physician paymenl, 
b. A Change in Emphasis to SMI 
As demonstrated in Figure 4, during the late sevt:ntie~ and early eighties, the 
average arulUa) growth rate was actually larger for Pari B physician services than for Part A 
inpatient hospital services. Specifically, during the interval 1975 through 1985, benefit 
payments for physician services increased at an average annual growth rate of 18 .5 percent 
compared to 16.3 percent for inpatient hospital services. (Ways and Means, 1994, p. 125) 
This cliffcrence in program growlh rates attracted the attention of political 
leaders and administrators to the risi ng cost of physician services (Epstein, ]993, p. 193) 
Studies and hearings regarding Part B outlays and efficiency fo llowed. The Congressional 
Budget Office in their 1986 publication, Physician Reimbursement Under Medh.·ore: Options 
for Challge, indicated that as n:view of the program progressed, policy makers and others 
became concemed that payment levels for services were be(;oming increasingly unrelated to 
the costs or medical value of the services (Congressional nudge! Office, 1986, p. 26). Their 
concelll appears to havc stemmed in part from the percept ion that physician fee different ials 
under pre-Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS) methodology and by type of service "were creating 
fm ancial incentives for unnecessary tests or for surgical ancl other proced ural care over 
cognitive care, such as history-taking and discussion of methods by which patients might 
pn..'Vent or alleviate their own symptoms (Congressional Budget Office, 1986. p. 31). Other 
sources of general dissatisfaction with the payment methodology of the time include a belief 
that the methodology encouraged "increases in both the plice and the volume ofservi~es" and 
"overspecialization by physicians"(Congressional Budget Office. 1986, p. 26) . As suggested 
by Moon (1993), this seems to have evolved into the percept ion that the existing payment 
methodology. (Customary, Pn.:vai ling and Reasonable (CPR)). provided a system that 
perpetuated inappropriate economic in~entives regarding the value of services that were being 
provided There was concern that the program was 
paying rdatively more for 
offering few incentives 
(Moon, 199:1 , p. 65) 
Concepts such as an "overvalued" and "undervalued procedures" began to appear in 
legislation and literature at approximately this time. References to overvalued procedures 
were generally associated with technology intensive services such as surgery. (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1086) In contrast reterences to undervalued procedures were idemiflcd with 
preventative care and services provid ed by family physicians and general practitioners 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1986) 
DcLewet al (1992) has indicated that these concerns were tied to the general 
perception that the health care system in the U.S. suffered 
l'his view was underscored in the Physician Paymem Rl'View Commission's (PPRC) June 16, 
1989 statement before the Subcommittee on Health and Long Term Care. The Commission 
indicated that there was "increasing evidence that beneficiaries were receivi ng SOme services 
that were considered unnecessary and failed to receive wme services that would benefit 
them" (Eisenberg, 1989, p. 7). The Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) was 
concerned that this trend was contributing to lower quality care at a greater cost. (Eisenberg, 
1989, p. 7) 
Also related to the growing outlay rate for Medicare Part B was the eITect 
existing incentive structures were having on physician populations. SpeGilically, it was 
"suggested that the growing number of physicians was a Gause ofrising medical expenditures 
and that reducing the number of physicians per 1000 people would help to Gontain costs" 
(Congressional Budget OffiGe, 1 <)95, p. 32) 
At the same time program strengths were also being recognized These 
strengths included 
Tile Medical Jndll_~'ry find 'Nlcdk(lrc 
During this period, growth in health cafe costs in the medical industry as a 
whole was being associated with 
insurance coverage, a 
biomed ical research 
technologies (DcLew, et aL 1992, p. 159) 
Although influenced hy these imlustry-widc influences, the growth in Medicare Part B 
expenditures was attributed to more specific factors 
10 
Explanations for grovvth in Part B expenditures included a combination orthe 
following fktors a) the expansion of Medicare coverage in 1973 to include the disabled and 
the subsequent growth in lhe number of enrolled persons with end-stage renal disease 
(ESRD), h) growth in the use and scope of Suppiementary Medical Insurance (SMI) 
outpatient services, c) the implementation of Prospective Payment System (PPS), which 
provides financial incentives fo r eliminating or reducing Hospital Insurance (HT) inpatient 
hospital care and channeling appropriate types of care to Supplementary Medical Insurance 
(SMl) ambulatory settings, d) growth in the number of physicians piiJticipating in the 
Medicare program, e) the incrc(lsed scope, complexity, and cost of physician services and f) 
the changing demographic llI ~keup of the enrolled Medicare population (Health Care 
Financing Administration, 1902, p. 26) 
(i Cause.~ o/Groll'lh: Ellrolfmcnl (l1If1l}lilizulioll 
Medicare Pal1 B benetit payments being drawn from the general fu nd was 
increasing (see Figure 2). A portion of this expenditure growth may attributed to an increase 
in program enrollmem, Depicted in Figure 5 is a trend of Supplementary !l.1edical Insurance 
(srvU) enrollment statistics that shows an increase from a level of23)39,000 persons in 1975 
(0 approximately 32,33],000 persons in ]000 The rate of growth for enrollment during th is 
period was approximately 38 percent 
Fif,'l.lre 6 demonstrates thilllJenefit payments per enrollee were also growing 
during this period. llcnefit payments per benefl(;i~ry grew from an ~vemge level of $161 per 
enrollee in 1975 to and average of $1282 per enrollee in 1990. During the same period when 
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMT) enrollment growth had increased by 38 percent, 
" 
average payments per beneficiary had grown by approximately 696 percent, more than 
eighteen times more rapidly 
It should be noted that not all enrollment growth during this period is 
attributable to the aged. In the early seventies there occurred an event that "substantially 
increased the commitments of all aspects" (Moon, 1993, p. ] 1) of the Medicare program 
Legi~lation was passed extending Medicare coverage to disabled persons and to individuals 
with end-stage renal di~ease (ESRD) The effect of this policy was that the two affected 
groups 
added to Medicare'~ rolls resulted in an instant expansion of 10 percent in 
the number of beneficiaries and an even larger boos! to the costs of the 
program, since disabled to be more expensive to cover than 
the elderly, 199], p, ]2). 
The impact on the average annual benefit per person enrolled in Part B resulting from 
rcsulting from the provision of coverage to disabled beneliciaries and those with end-stage 
renal disease (ESRD) is read ily observable in Figure 7. Specifically, Figure 7 demonstrates 
the impact that the average Supplemental)' Medical Tnsuranee (SMI) benefit received by 
disabled beneficiaries has on the average total benefit received by all recipients. 
These trends indicate tilat, increased enrollment and utilization contributed to 
growth in program costs. Health Care f inancing Administration projections indicate that thesc 
trends will continuc and show no signs of abatil1g il1 the l1ear fu!me . (Health Care Financing 
Administration, 1994) The data presented next indicates that revenue st ream policy decisions, 
12 
populat ion demographics and economic conditions may also have contributed to 
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) cost growth. 
Revenlle Stre(lm Sffltu.~ and Policies 
While demands on the general fund to suppon Medicare Part B were 
increasing, those being made on Supplementary Medical Tnsurance (SMJ ) en rollees remained 
relatively constant. Relative to economic conditions during this period. policies tha t 
determined the levels for the Supplementary Medical Tnsurance (S.\11) dcductibles and 
prem ium levels may have cont ribut ed to cost growt h 
As shown in Figure S, the level at which the Supplementary Medical Insurance 
(SMl) deductible W(lS establ ished h,uJ changed only once over the period 1966-1990 and then 
only by a total of S25. Simultaneously, as shown in Figu re 9, the Medical Consumer Price 
Index, a measu re of the amount ofinfilltion in med ical costs, grew at a greater rate than the 
total consumer price ind ex for the period 
An effect caused by holding the Supplementary :\1edical Insu rance (SMI) 
deductible rates at a relatively low level while the medical industry was experiencing relat ively 
significant inflation was a constant erosion in the purchasing power of the deductihle portion 
of Supplementary Medical insurance (S'Ml), As a result, enrollees were likely to exhaust their 
deductible and make claims against Part B at a rme that increased with the passage oftimc 
"By 1991, more than 80 percent of all Medicare enrollees exceeded the deductible amount, 
compared to 52 percent in 1975" (Moon . 1993, p_ 45) . Normalized data provided by the 
Health Care Financing Admini stration (HCFA) in their February 1995 M,'dicare and 
Afedicaid Slatistical Supplemenl filrther support this eflect Specifically, " in 1967, an 
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estimated 7.2 million Medicare beneficiaries used covered services, an annual rate of 366 
persons served per 1,000 enrollees. By 1992. an estimated 27.9 million beneficiaries used 
covered Medicare services, an annual rilte of785 persons served per 1,000 enrollees, or more 
than 2.1 times higher than the rate in 1967" . (Health Care Financing Administration, 1992, 
p.26) 
Simultaneously, the purchasing power of the Medicare Part B premium 
relative to program expenditures was also declining. As demon:;tra ted in Figure 10, :;ince 
program introduction, the portion of benefit payments as compared to premium income has 
remained in excess of its 1967 level of 1.0. This indicates that in order to meet required 
program expenditures, an increasingly larger portion of the payment for physician services 
was being made up of revenue from the general fund. For example, the 19'-)0 ratio was 
constructed by dividing the total benefit payments of $41 ,498 million by $1 1,494 million, the 
total premium income from program participants, for a ratio of36 
f. Program Outfay.~ and the Cost SharinJ: l1urtfen 
From the program's inception, the government's share of the Medicare Part 
n benefit payments has grown. As indicated in Figure 10. the ratio of benefit payment to 
premium income has increased from a value of 10, or a 100 percent share for beneficiaries 
in 1967 to a level of 3.5, or approximately a 72 percent share for the government in 1989 
Note that during this period the ratio reached a level as high as 4.6, Specifically, in 1987 as 
the need for physician reform was being considered, the government was paying out $4 .60 
for every $1.00 received from program participants or an e<luiv~lent shilre of approximately 
80 per~ent.(Health Care Financing Administmtion. 1994, p. 38) 
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Similarly, program oUllay~ abo grew d\Jring this period. Figure II provides 
outlays for the period Figure 12 provides outlays as a percent increa~e over the previous 
year. While Figure 4 demonstrates past and projected outlay growth rates in Part A and Part 
B, Figure J) indicates that beginning in 20 JO, a point beyond the projections provided in the 
aforeme11lioned figures, outlay rates me li kely to grow even more A comparison of 
Medicare Part n program income relative 10 outlays (totill disbursements) for selected 
periods is provided in Figure J4, Figure 14 ind icates lh<11 through 1993 income exceeded 
outlays. As mentioned previously, !l.1edicarc P:lrt 13 total income is defined as the sum of 
three compom:nts: a) premiums from participants, b) interest and other income, and 1;) 
government contlibutions_ Total disburscments are comprised of two components a) benefit 
payments and b) administrative expenses. The financial status of the Supplementary Mcdic <ll 
Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund is dependent upon the "total net assets and the liabil ities of the 
program"(Health Care financing Administration, 1994, p. 35) and may be I;alculated by fi rst 
surruning total program income for the ClIlTent year with the trust fund balance from the prior 
year and subtr<lcting current year disbursements 
g, Impact nfflll! Price (~f Physician Services 
Gro\'.1h in the price of physician services also had an impact on program costs 
Thi s phenomenon becomes evident by considering the ratio of physician income to 
opportullity costs for physicians over the histOlY of the Medicare program. This performance 
measure provides an indication ofa physician's income relative to the income an individual 
would be li kely to be e<lrning had they pu rsued the career of a "typical college graduate" 
Data gathered by the Congressional Budget Office (CI30) ind icates that the value for this 
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ratio was approximately 1.25 just prior to the introduction of Medicare. In ]971 the ratio had 
risen to a peak value of approximately 1.5. It has maintained an average value of 
approximately 1.35 throughout the eighties. The Congrcssional Budget Office (CBO) has 
indicated that program payment incentives initiated the cycle of attracting physicians and 
increasing program costs (Congressional Budget Office, ]995, pp. 26-27) Specifically, "the 
historical evidence is consistent with the view that the introduction of those government 
insurance programs brought about a surge in demand for physicians' services which in 
"led to an increase in physicians' income" (Congressional Budget Office, 1995, p, 26), 
Furthermore, Moon notes that the per enrollee Supplementary Medical 
Insurance (SM3) benefit payments adjusted for inflation in the medical ind ustry grew by nearly 
]00 percent over the period 1975-1990. (Moon, 1993, p. 46). Various price control 
strategies were tried throughout this period in an attempt to reduce physician price growth 
One of the most notable measures imposed a Ireeze on the reimbursement rates to physicians 
In FY 1984 rates wcre frozen at FY ]')83 levels with a projected savings of$700 mill ion 
(Bureau of National Aff..lirs, 1983, p. Y -I). At the end ofFY 19l14 Congress extended the 
freeze an additional year with the anticipation of saving $(j00 million in FY 1985 (Bureau of 
National Affairs, ]984, p. DJ3) 
Freezes in physician payment rates as growth control measures for physician 
payment were unlikely to be tolerated indefi nitely. After the two-year freeze, indexing of 
physician payment rates resumed . Specifically, the 1976 implementation of the Social 
Security Amendments of 1972 required that updates for prevailing charges for physicia ns not 
exceed the Medicare Economic Indt:x (1''>'1''E1) . Analogous to the Medical consumer price 
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index, the Medicare Economic Index (MEl) was intended 10 serve as "a proxy for measuring 
changes in physicia ns' practice costs and earni ngs.(Lc")', et ai., 1992, p. NS8S) . As such, 
beginning in FY1986, growth rat es were once again determi ned by the Medicare Econolll i<; 
Index (f'l..fEI ). This mechanism for controlling growth was employed in th is fo rm until the 
implementation of Ihe Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 1989 and Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 1990 physician reform measures 
Although one possible response from physicians 10 the implementation of lhe 
payment fi 'eeze may have heen to see fewer Medicare patients, the ~tat istic s from the period 
do not to support that behavior. As depicted in Figure 15, the volume of Supplementary 
Medi(;al ln sur~nce (SMI) benefi(;iaries receiving reimbursed services conti nued to increase 
thrOUghOllt the eighties. One could interpret the data as indicating t h ~t Medie~re, responsibic 
for approximately 25 percent ofpcrsonal he~lth care expenditures, was able to achieve minor 
savings during this period, in part, because the market for physician services had a re latively 
low price elastic ity of su pply. Specitically, during the freeLe instead of refus ing to provi de 
services to Medicare Part U patients physicians behaved as price t1\kers 
h. lnrlirect Efrect.~ (~r IHcrii /:(lrr. Part A 
f he Prospcctive Payment System (PPS) for Medicare Pan A is also credited 
with increasing Part H expendilures.(Health Care Financing Administration, 1992. p. 26) This 
effect is a result of hospital and physician l"(:sponses to the Prospective Payment System (PI'S) 
incentives and te(;hnolog i(;al adv~nces tha t appear to have encouraged the accelerated 
rest ructuring ofa number of care procedures. As a result of Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) implementation, many procedures traditionally performed on an inpatient basis were 
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converted to and performed as outpl\tient procedure~. Consequently, hospital outpatient 
procedures grew faster thl\n any other servi!.:C provided by Medicare. In 1992,"the thirty-one-
fold increase in hospital outpatient payments since 1974 far exceeds the clevenfold increase 
in overall Medicare payments and the ninefold increase in overall hospital payments by 
Medicarc"(Health Care Financing Administration, 1992, p, 96), During this period, hospi tal 
outpatient ser,rices, which are paid for primarily by Medicare Part B, "comprised 8.2 perccnt 
of total Medicare payments in 1992. compared with 2,9 percent in 1974"(Health Care 
Financing Administration, 1992, p, 98) 
Other examplcs of behaviors prompted by Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) include lab work in support of inpatient procedures being conducted prior to 
admission. after discharge or both. (Moon, 1986, pp, 331-332) In addition to technological 
advances, hospitals responded to the constraints presented by the DRG-driven reimbursement 
rates by seeking a more cost effective manner in which to provide care, By providing care 
in a hospital outpatient setting. physicians were able to provide a service similar to that 
previously provided, while receiving reimbursement from Medicare under the relatively more 
generous Current, Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) payment methodology, avoiding 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) constraints. (Health Care Financing Administration, J 992, 
p.26) 
Increase in Physicians Electin!: 10 "Participate" 
Increased physician participation in the Medicare program is also credited with 
eontIibliting to expenditure growth, Since the en,\ctment of the Medicare Program in 1965, 
a number of successful policics were created thi\! 511ccessfully encouraged both physicians and 
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beneficiaries to pat1icipatc in the program. Of the more prominent and readily observable 
policies wen: those pertaining to physician payment methodology and administrative 
oversight . Initial payment levels are tJesnilJed as having been relatively generous and the 
professional environment such that "doctors wert;~ promi~ed no restrictions as to the care Ihey 
could provide".(Moon, 1993, r 64) 
For the fi rst 2S years or the Medicare prograllllhe physician rc~ponse was 
consistent with policy incentives As ilillstrmed in Fi!;urc 16, in the ahsence of any significant 
physician payment reform elfort s during the lil'sl quarter century of the program, the 
percentage of physicians participating in Medicare has grown stt:adily_ As illustrated in 
Figures 16 and ]7, physician populiltions in generill and Medieilre participating physici~ns in 
particular grew throughout the 1080s and levels art;~ expected to continue to grow into the 
fore seeable futur~ (Congres~ional Budget Office, 1095, pp, 26-27) 
Consistent with the gro\.\1.11 in the ratio or physician income to the opportunity 
cost associated with not being a physician is the trend in active physicians per 10,000 
popufation, As Figure 18 demonstrates, in 1970 there was an average or only 15 6 physicians 
per 10,000 population. By 1991 tha t number had increased to an average 01'24,2 per 10,000 
and it is projected to reilch 27,7 hy the year 2010 This trend mily be of particular concern 
because even if there is a surplus in the number of physicians, physicians may be able to 
"create demand and thereby add \0 rising health costs"(Rice. et ai, 1989, Pl'. 587-600) 
Phpieilln PopUlation Lomposition 
During the eighties, policy makers argued that the Current, Prevailing and 
Reasonable (CPR) payment methodology locked in historical inequities with regard to 
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trea tment incentives, Specifically, policy makers indicated that major inequities were being 
perpetuated because, "the CPR methodology 'overpays' technical procedures like surgery and 
'underpays' other services such as ollice vis its"(Lee, 19')4, p, 65). Consequently, while 
throughout the ~,,'Ve ntie~ and eighties physician populations increased, the specialties enjoyed 
the greater share of the revenue growth. This in turn argued the policy makers, fostered a 
more rapid growth in spccialtie!; than in general practi tioners. (Congressional Budget Office, 
1986, pp. xvii-xix) 
The distribution of physicians by specialty was believed to have wntributed 
10 high program expenditures. (Department of Health and Human Services, 199 1, p. 109) 
Because of their additional training and high rales, services provided by specialists were 
perceived to be of greater value than generalists. Beneficiaries, seeking to receive the hest 
available care and benefiting from Part B ~ubsidies, tended to seek specialist treatment. For 
example, in 1984 prima ry care providers, consist ing of general practitioners, family 
practitioners and doctor~ of internal medicine, received approximately 34 ,7 percent of the 
amounts allowed for physician services. Surgical specialists, which include general surgery, 
otolaryngology, neurosurgery, gynecology, ophthalmology, onhopedic surgery, plastic 
surgery, colon and rectal surgery, thoracic surgery, and urology, cla imed approximately 36,2 
percent of Part B a llowed amO\lnts The remainder of payments was distributed 10 
nonsurgical specialists (14,3 percent), radiologists (8A percent), anesthesiologists (4.8 
percent), pathologists (0 ,9 percent) (lnct osteopaths (0.7 percent). (Congressional Budget 
Oftkc, 1986, p. 17) 
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The Current, Prevailing and Rl:asonable (CPR) payml:nt methodology was also 
credited with providing relatively low payment incentives for rural prat:titioners. Note that 
orthe physicians that were in active practice in rural areas in 1988, "about]] perccnt were 
primary care physicians (family practice, gcncral pcdiatrics, and intcrnalmcdicine) and the 
remainder was spet:iali~ls"(Politzer, et al., 1991, pp. 10-1-109)_ In addition to evident:e that 
indicates the rural prat:titioners were paid less than their urban COUTlterparl~, there was a 
general inconsistency in the geographic distribution of payment rates_ Payments for hip 
replacements in 19R4 provirle an example of this phenomcnon For example, in j 984 "the 
prevailing charge for total hip replacement in Washington, D.C., was $1,547, t:ompared with 
$4,126 in New York City" (Epstein. et aL 1993, p. ] 93) 
To reduce costs caused by these ineCluities, decision makers were confronted 
wilh two challenges: 1) the crcation of an incentivc structure that would encourage a 
migration from the rdatively higher paying specialties to till the perceived void ill primar)' care 
providl:rs and 2) to correct a perceived problem by creating incentivl:S that would 
result ill a migration from an indusIJ)' with predominantly urban practices to one that provided 
for needs in Tun\1 areas. (Epstein, et ,\1, 1993, p. ]93) 
k. Physici(ln SeYl'icel': Scope, COfflp/e:dty (lnd Cost 
The increflscd scope, complexity. find cost of physician services a~ wl!ll as 
increases in the volume of scrviecs pr-oviried per beneficiary Illay also have contributed to 
increases in the real cost ofheallh care. Changes ill scope ami complexity imply an aggregate 
change in the intensity of care (Danzoll. 1993, pp_677-683) "Intensity reflects changing 
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tedUlology, quality, and other factors that makc any given service, such as a diagnost ic test, 
more resource-intcnsive than it was in the past" (Danzon, 1993, p. 677-(83) 
From an economic perspective, the stlbsidy provided by Medicare tends to 
distort the marginal cost/marginal benefit relationship when considering whether or not to use 
new technology in the treatment of an il1ne~s. A practice consistent with the incent ives 
prov ided by subsidized care is for the physicians to compare the margi nal benefi t of a new 
technology to the cost 10 the beneficiary and not to the total cost of the treatment 
Specifically, the total cost of the trCi\tment is the amount billed to the beneficiary plus that 
bi ll ed to the insurer. In the case of Medicare Pan B, decisions regarding the llSC of new 
technologies for beneficii\ry trcatment under the Current, Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) 
methodology were often being based on a cost that wa~ approximately 25 percent of that 
actually being incurred. (Danzon, 1993) As suggested by Danzon, the bottom line is that 
"technology appears to be thc single most important factor dr iving health carc costs 
currently"{Danzon, 1993 , p. (79) 
Beneficiary DemoJ;raphics 
Changing demographics have also been cred ited with contributing to the 
growth of Pan 13 expend itures. "Tn 1992, the 85 years of age or ovcr group represented 9.9 
pcrcent of the total enrolled population. comp(lred with only 8.1 percent in 1978" (Health 
Care Fi nancing Administration, 1992, p. 26). Longer life spans imply longer periods of 
program eligibility for recipients and consequent ly greater demands 011 program resources 
As demonstrated in Fib'Ures 19 and 20, the steady gradual i ncrea~e in life expectancy at birth 
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and at age 6:'i indicates that the population in the United States. enhan<.:ed by the forth<.:oming 
arr ival of the "baby boomers," will continue to grow older 
intr.nsity of Physician Sen·icr.,~· 
The rok played by cost! benefit measures a~ a decision variable for assessing 
the appropriate kvel of care intensity also appears to have been a significant consideration 
during the pre-refonn period. The importance of th is variable was stressed by Danzon when 
she suggested that "massive government subsidies cause medical providers to use 
technology that consumers may value less than the (actual) cost"(Danzon, 1993, p. 679) 
An observation of economic inef1i<.:iency . this statement begs the fluest ion of applying 
appropriate performance rneasure~ to gauge the effectiveness of resource allocation and 
suggests that price be used as the discriminator 
At present no single performance measure is accepted to gauge medical 
prog ram performance. As illustrated in Figure 2C a progressively increasing share of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been alld cOll timles to be devoted to health care. Olle 
possible measure of program performll1lce uses life expecWllcy and mortality rates as a 
measure of return on the Ilational investmCIl\. As a llleasure of program SllCCCSS these 
statistics are not very cncour<lging Even though the United States commits more economic 
resources to healt h <.:are than any other nation it is still ranked 17th in male life expect<lncy, 
16th in female life expectancy. and 20th in inlant 1I10:1<1lity. (Schit:ber. et a\., 1991, pp. 22-38) 
It can be argued that the U.S life expectancy and mortality statistics are 
misleading <lnd, that re lntive to other developed countries, 1lI0re intense social problems in 
the United Statt:s such as violent crime lTlay bt: credited with deflating the overall pnformance 
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of the medical industry. COeLew, et aI., 1992, p. IS7) Becallse of this and similar trends, 
ambiguity continues to exist. Regl!rd less, there does not seem 10 be a consenSllS as to what 
constitutes an appropriate set of performance measures for determining the effectiveness of 
the investment in health care services for the nation. Without an accepted set of performance 
and economic measures, optimum resource allocation is difficult to identify. (Danloon, 1993, 
p. 677) 
C RESPONSE TO THE EJ\VlRONl\lENT 
Although many complex and interrelated factors have contributed to Supplementary 
Medical Insurance (SMJ) cost growth, the datl! that has been presented suggests that decision 
makers have targeted three desired outcomes from physician payment reform as prescribed 
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of \9S9 and 1990. (Levy, et aI., 1992, p. NS80) 
First, through the Medicare fee Schedule (MFS) they atlClnpted to realign the ineentivc 
structure for physicians. By realigning payment incentives it appears that decision makers 
sought: 1) to eliminate geographical payment inequities locked-in by the Current, Prevailing, 
or Reasonable payment methodology, 2) to improve access to care for beneficiaries in m rai 
areas, and J) to eliminate distortions in payments caused by procedures that were perceived 
to be "overvalued." (Oepartmenl ofHeahh and Human Senrices, 1991. pp. 1-179) 
Second. the Medicare Volume Performance Standard (MVPS) was implemented to 
control the rate at which program costs would be allowcd 10 increase. In this case it appears 
that decision makers sought to impose some responsihility on the medical industry for 
controlling cost growth by modifying the mechanism used to govern the growth in payment 
Specifically, by adding an adjustment factor to the Medicare Economic Index (MET) 
it seem~ that decision makers attempled to Illotivate mediclll profe~sional organizations to 
monitor and influence the hehaviors ofphysieians_ (Rice, et aI., 1900, p. 295) 
Finally, llsing the maximum allowable actual charge (MAAC), it appears that decision 
makers sought to protect beneficiaries from increased burdens that may have resulted as an 
outcome of Medicare Fcc Schedule (MFS) and Medicare Volume Performaru,:c Standard 
(MVPS). (Levy, et aI. , 1992, p. NSRO) In particular. it appears that there was concern that 
physicians might respond to Mcdiclue fee Schedule (N1FS) and Medicare Volume 
Performanec Standard (MVPS) hy passing along greater costs to heneficiaries through the 
practice ofbaiam;c billing. (Levy, ct. ai., 1 '),12, p. NS80) Maximum Allowable AClUal Charge 
(MAAC) diminated th is alternative by providing caps that defined lhe maximum level of 
balance billing that would he allowed. (Department of Health and Human Services, 199 1, pr . 
1-179) In order to gain a better understanding of how decision lllakers set out to achieve 
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]l. PllYS]ClAN PAYMENT REFORM 
A. KEY EVJ<:NTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF PAYME NT REFORl\'l 
This chapter addresses the mechanics and salient policies pertaining to physician 
payment reform The discussio n begi ns with the Current, Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) 
payment methodology and transitions into the reql(i rements of the physician payment refo rm 
effort specified in the Omnibus Budget Reconcil iation Acts (OBRA.s) of 1989 and 1990 
CustOnt:lry, Prevailing nud Rensollable (CPR) Methodology 
For the first 25 years of Medicare Pan B the Current, Prevailing and Reasonabl e 
(CPR) methodology was used to pro\oide tor the payment of physician services Throughout 
tlus period the application of the Curre[]t, Prevailing and Reasonabk (CPR) methodology may 
be viewed as undergoing three distinct phases in response to demands on the program 
The first phase occurred from 1966 throllgh 1971 . During this time, the Cunent, 
Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) met hodology achievecl success at encouraging physician 
participation but was "widely thought to be unsatisfilctory" (Congressional Budget Ollice, 
1986, p. 26). The reasons indicated by the Congressional Budget Office (CHO) for this belief 
were that the Cunent, Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) methodology encouraged "increases 
in both the price and volume of services, with resultant increases in costs for the Medicare 
program and Med icare enrollees (ColiglessionaJ Budget Office, 1986, p. 26). These costs, 
resulting from the provision of an incentive structure designed 10 attract physician 
participation, contributed toward "a higher rate of growth in Medicare's costs for physicians' 
services than can be explained by gro\\1h in Medicare enrollment and in general innation 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1986, p. 28). This phllse ended in 197 1 when the Nixon 
administration sought to control growth hy imposing a wage-price freeze that lasted for a 
period of three years. 
A difference between phase one and phase two was the introduction of attempts to 
control the gro\\1h in program costs. When the wage-price freeze was lifted in 1975, 
program cost growth was no longer being determined by the customary billing practices of 
physicians. Although physicians were still free to charge what they desired, Medicare would 
only reimburse them on the bllSis of the allowed charge for a procedure. Specifically, the 
"allowable" or "reasonable charge" for a physiciilll's services was takcn to be the lower of 
three rates: the ~ctual charge, the customary charge, or the prevailing charge. The June 5, 
1991 Hea lth lind Human Services (J-IHS) proposed ru le for a fee schedule for physicians' 
services defines customary charge as the medi~n charge of the physician for the service during 
the July through June data collection period preceding the current calendar year and 
prevailing charge as the amount set high enough to cover the full customary charges of the 
phy~icians whose billings have accounted for at least 75 percent or the charges in the locality 
for that service (Department of Health and Human Services, 199 1, p. 14) 
Furthermore, with regard to growth in payment rates, the government modified the 
original formula to limit the rate of increase in prevai ling charges to the Medicare Economic 
Index (MEl). (Freeland et al" 1991. pp. 61.64) Although the policies implemented during 
this phase reduced the grow1h in costs to Medicare P~rt B. they placed beneficiaries at 
greater financial risk. This risk w~s ~ result of no;]participating physicians being able to 
recover some of'thcir lost income from beneficiaries by employing balance hilling practices 
(phelps ct ~ I .. 1986, p. 124) }\ riescription of this cl~ssificlltion system and bill ing practice 
follows later in this chapter. The end of this phase. like the one before it, \vas marked by the 
imposition of price freezes Tn this inst~nce, the freezes followed the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 1984 
Ti](:. thiru phase in the development of reimbursement for pr.ysician services 
began 'With the Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) of 1984 and lasted u;]t il the implementation 
of payment reform under the Omnibus Budget Reconcil:ati on Ac!.> (OBI0\5) of 1989 anu 
1990. Prior 10 the Delicit Reduction Act (DEFRA) of 1984, physicians had the nexibility of 
choosing \\t.ether or nOI to accept assignment of the Medicule al lowable r~te for ~ service on 
a patient.by.patient basis The Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) of 19&4 requil-ed physicians 
to choose between ploviding services as a pal1icipating physiciu;] and agreeing to accept 
assignment as payment in tl lil fOI a ll Medicue patients or elcl;ting to be classified as a 
nonpartil;ipating physician (Conglessiona l Budget Oflice, 19S(), pp 22.24) DUling this 
period incentives wele structlileu to increase the rlumber ofphysici~ns electing to register in 
a participat:ng status. (phelps, et ~I . 1986. pp 17.4·125) t\s a result of the inl;entivcs created 
in this phase, beneficiaries were abl e to minill\i<:e their fHlanciai risk by eiecting to obtain thei r 
cale f1011I a participating physic ian 
Participating and Nonparlicipming Physician~' 
(I) Participating The Dcficit Reduction Act (OEFRA) of 1984 
required physicians to formally dect to be classified as "panicipating" or "nonpanicipating 
physicians." The significance of this deci sion w~s th~t it influenced thc manner and amount 
in which physicians could be expected to be reimbu rsed for their services_ A "panicipating" 
physician was an indivi du~l who ~greed to accept "assignment" on all claims for Medicare 
participants covered by the program. Acceptance of assignment was the physician's consent 
to accept the Medicare allowable charge as payment in full for a service Conseqllently, a 
participating physician did not usc "balance bil ling," the practice of bill ing patients for the 
marginal difference between the Medicare payment rate and tke physician's actual charge for 
a service. Instead, the participating physician was able to receive 80 percent of the allowable 
charge for the service directly from Medicare. They would then be responsible for billing the 
beneficiary for the remaining 20 percent or coinsurance portion of the allowable charge. In 
1989, about 45 percent of all licensed physiei.ms signed "panicipating" agreements with 
fv1edicare and more than 60 percent of Medicare payments were made to "participating" 
physicians. (Congressional Budget Ollice, 1990) 
(2) Nonpanicipating. "Nonparticipating" physicians could, on a claim-
by-claim basis, elect to reject assignment of the Medicare allowable charge , Relative to 
Medicare reimbursement levels. rejection ora~s i gnlllent brought financial consequences and 
a degree of risk for the physicians. A nonparticipating physician who did not accept 
assignment would be cornpens~ted at a rate of 9S percent of that received by panicipating 
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phy~icians in the locality. The coinsurance p0l1ion paid by the beneficiary, traditionally 20 
percent ofthc allowable charge, would also be based on this reduced rate. Howl;:ver, unlike 
the "participating" physician, a "nonparticipating" physician was able to employ the practice 
of "balance bill ing." The amount contained in the balance billing portion of the tran~action 
was determined by subt ract ing the Medicare allowable rate from the nonparticipating 
physician's fee for the service. The balance bil ling portion of the fee could only be recovered 
from the beneficiary. For example. if a nonparticipating physician billed $110 for a service 
and the Medicare allowable ch:uge for the service was $100 the phy~ician wO\lld be paid as 
follows 
• Medicare's share $100 X 9,<;% X 80% = $76 
• Coinsurance .~ hare $]00 X 9<;% X 20% = $19 
• Ralance billing total: $110 - $9<; = $ 15 
• Total received by physician = S76 + $ 19 + $15 = $ 110 
In addit ion to the lower prevailing fees for nonpal1icipaling physicians and the 
increased administrative effort anel risk of defaliit associated with balancing billing practices, 
the Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) of 1984 provided additional incentives to elect to 
become a pal1icipating (PAR) physician. These incentives included "directories of 
participating physicians, disseminati on of ":1I1l e, of p~rticip~ting physicians vi[l toll-free 
telephone numbers, and provision for electronic receipt of cI~j ms by carriers"(Health Care 
Financing Administ ration. 1992. p. 16t) 
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Another incentive to encourage p(l11icip~tion was also provided by the Deficit 
Reduction Act (lJEFRA) of 1984. Under its provisions ~nd beginning in 1984, the allowed 
cost.;; for physician scrvices wcre to be fro<':en \lntil October 1985, Although the freeze was 
intended to last fourteen months, its fm~l duration was dependent upon the participation 
status of physicians_ For participating physicians the freeze ended on May I, 1986, while 
nonparticipating physicians were extended until Jallumy I, 1987, (Congressional Budget 
Office, 1986, p, xvi) During the periou between May I, 1986 and JanualY I, 1987 
"part icipating physicians were allowed to increase clwrges to Medicare patients 
establish a higher fee level for subsequent periods"(f'helps et ai, 1986, p, 142). However, 
nonparticipating physicians were not given the S(ll11e opportunity. A re~ ult ofthi~ policy was 
that more physicians elected to accept assignment with the hope of achieving higher future 
fcc levels_ Participation increased from approximately 59 percent of the physician popUlation 
in 1984 to 68,5 percent in 1985 (Phel ps, etal, 1986, p. 142) 
B. CHANGE IN PHYSICIAN RETMBURSEMENT: ORRA 89 AND OBRA 90 
In 1988, Congre% provided the Physician Payment Reform Commission (PPRC) with 
a mandate that included instructions to consider "policies to moderate the rate of increase in 
(physician payment) expenditures and the usc of services (Lee, 1990, p, 277). The Physician 
Payment Refonn COlTImis~ion's (PPRC) recommcndations becnme the basis for the payment 
refonn effort specified by Congress in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 
]989 and 1990 (Lee, 1990, p 270), The 1989 uill h~d three objectives: " I) to crente 
equitable prices lor Medicare physician selv;ces: 2) to reduce the explosive gro\\1h in 
52 
Medicare Pan B expenditures; and 3) to protect beneficiaries from increased liability" (Levy, 
et aI., 1992, p. NS80). The Medicare fee Schedule (l\.1FS) was implemented to address Ihe 
perception of inc qui lies in the Part B reimbursemenlmelhod (Levy, et al., 1992, pp . NS80-
NS81). Part n co~t growth was addressed in the methodology provi ded under the Medicare 
Volume Performance Standard (MVPS) (Levy, et al ,1992, pp , NS80-NS81). In response 
to increased recipient cost liability, the practice of"balance billing" was addressed in the 
revision of the Maximum Allowable Actual Charge (MAAC) mechanism (Levy et aI., 1992) 
All three mechanisms are to some degree interdependent am! are discussed below in the 
section headed "Physician Payment Reform" A oiagrarn of these mechanisms and their key 
components is provided in Figure 22 
Requirements ofORHA 89 and OBRA 90 
The Omnibus Budget Reconci liation Act (OBRA) of 1989, amended by thc Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliat ion Act (OBRA) of 19')0, arc thc legislative vehicles that directed the 
implementation of the resource baseo physician fee schedule This sect ion addresses both the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of these requirements 
2. Reform l\1edul1Iisms 
The Medicare V"f,lnle Pcrfnrmat/ce Stnntlf1rtl.~ (MVPS) 
In order to plar.e a control on the rate of growth fOf payment ratcs Congress 
required the establishment of ~ votume performance standard r~te for updating physici~n 
payment rates, (Rice and Bernstein, 1990, p 295) Prior to its implementation and after 1975 
allowable charges were permitled 10 increase at a ratc specified by the Medicare Economic 
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Index (rvtEI) . With the implementation ofthlO volume performance standard methodology, 
an allowable growth rate or "update f"cwr" was introduced_ This f"ctor is determined by one 
of two methods: congressional action or by lise of the "default fo rmula" methodology 
If Congress chooses to, they lIlay establish an "update factor" in law. Under 
this option, the Secrelary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Physician Payment 
Review Corrunission (pPRC) would provide a recommended value for the "upd ate faclor" to 
the Congress The recommended value must allow for facto rs such as "inflatio n, changes in 
Ihe volume and intensity of services, access to services, and past experience with Medicare 
spending on physician services. (Department of Healt h and I-Iuman Services, 199 1, p. 75) 
Upon receipt of the recommendation from the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services "Congress may choose to el1iKt the Secret<lry' s reco mmerldation, enact some other 
update amount, or not act at <Il l" (Department ofl Iealth and Human Serviccs, 1991, p. 75) 
If Congress elects not to act, a "default target" is provided under the law (Congressional 
Blldget Office, 1990, p. 12). The default target method uses the re lat ionship provided in 
Figure 23 to determine the value for the upd<lle 1:1ctOL This rel ationship relies on both 
projected and his toric values. SpecificaUy, the dependent variable, the update factor , is 
detennined by the relationship between three independent variables: a) the projected Medicare 
Economic Index (MEl) for the follov.ing ye.1r, b) the "defau lt target" from the previous year, 
and c) the actual growth in Medicare ex penditures from the previous year 
The projected Medicare Economic Index (MEl) is all estimate of the growth 
expected to take place in fact ors such as "a) pbysiciil11 earni ngs, b) nonphysician earnings, c) 
medical otlice expenses, d) medical supplies and resource materials, e) professional liability 
costs, and f) medical equipment costs"(Graboyes, 1994, p. (9). The "default target," taken 
from the previous year, comprises four f1\(;lors: I) the average percentage change in payment 
rates projected for the year; 2) the percentage changc in expenditures for physicians' services 
cxpe(;tl..J to result from changes in law or regulations: 3) the percentage change in the number 
of Medicare enrollees who will receive physicians' services in the fee-for-service sector; and 
the average annual percentage change in the volume of physicians' service~ per enrollee ovel 
the previous five years, minus a "performance standard factor" (PSF). The performance 
standard factor (PSF) is set by hlw at 0,5 per(;ent for 1990, 1 percent for 1991, 1.5 percent 
for 1992, and 2 percent for 1993 and sulJsequent years (Congressional Budget OtfLce, 1990, 
p. 12). Actual growth in Medicare expenditures is measured retrospectively, lIsing data for 
the previous year 
The default "update f~ctor,' under the default target method, is then calculated 
as depicted in Figure 23. Specifically, the def!lult update rate would be e(]ual to tbe projected 
Medicare Ewnomic Index (MEl) plus the difference between the "default target" and the 
"actual growth rate" from the prior calendar year. An example of this calculation is provided 
in Figure 24. It should be noted that during the Medicare Fee Schedule (rvIFS) transi tion 
period, Congress imposed limitations on the size of downward adjustments that may be 
implemented as a result of this process The magnitude of downward adjustments was 
capped at 2 percentage points for 1992 and 199:1, 2.5 percent~ge points for 1994 and [995 
:md three percentage points for subse(]tlent years (Congressional Budget Office, 1990, p. 13) 
b. The Meflicare Fee Schedule (MF.\J 
The second requirement of the Ornnibll~ Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) 
of 1989 and 1990 was the replacement of the Current. Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) 
payment mechani~m with a new fee schedule for physicians' services, As indicated in figure 
I, the new Medicare or Physician Fee Schedule (MFS) was based primarily on three elcments 
I) a relative value scale that ranks one service in relation to all others: 2) a geographic factor 
that adjusted for the cost differences in providing services in dilTerent geographic locations; 
and 3) a conversion factor that translated relative values and geographic adjustments into a 
dollar value for a service 
The payment amount for a service covered by the Medicare Fee Schedule 
(Mrs) may be calcu lated using the relationship provided in Figure 25 . The variahles 
presented in this form of the Medicare Fee Schedule (MTS) equation represent a service, S, 
being provided in a locality, A. For example, the relationship given in Figure 4 may be used 
to calculate the Medicare fee Schedu le (MFS) allowable d\arge for treating an infection (S) 
by applying a measure of the Relative Value Units (RVUs) associated with the procedure, 
adjustments for geographic costs associated with the location of the physician and a 
conversion factor that tran~lates the Relative Value Units (R VUs) and geographic factors into 
a dollar amount Tn the case of providing trcatment for thc infection, the relevant quantities 
would be the relrttive value of the physician's effort relative to the range orall other rtvailable 
procedun:s (RVUwS), the rel~tivc vrtltle of practice expenses incurred in support of treating 
the infection CRVUpeS), the relrttive v~llle of malpl'uctice insur~nce expense allocable to 
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treatment orthe infection (RVUmS). the geographic adjustment factors that would adjust the 
Relative Value Units (R VUs) for geogmphic loc~tion (GPClwA, GPClpeA ~nd GPCImA) 
and tile Conversion Factor (CF) that had been determined by the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) 
(I) Rc\"tivc Value Sc"k (RVS) anI: orthe three components of the 
Medic"re Fee Schedule is the relative value scale (RVS). The relative valul: scale (RVS) 
established a hierarchy that compares <lnd ranks different types of physician services across 
specialties based on a measure of physicians' work, a measure of thc physicians' practice 
costs used to support the service, <lnd a measure of malprltct ice insurance cost.~ The 
physici"ns' work scale WitS developed by ~ three-phased Health and Human Services OlliS)-
sponsored study executed by a H<lrvard University research team_ (Health and Human 
Services. 1991) Pract ice expense and malp'-dctice Relative Value Units (RVUs) were 
developed. as described below, using ~ different methodology 
In detellnining the appropriate Relative V"iue Units (RVUs) assigned 
to pllysicians' work.thc Harvllrd sllIdy f()cusl:d on the reSOllrccs required by a physician to 
perform a scrvice . The first phase of the study used a national survey in which random 
samples of 185 physicians in each of 18 speciaitil:s were sdected As pan of the survey short 
descriptions or vigncttes of physician services were providcd _ About 100 physicians in each 
specialty evaluated selvices described by each vignette in term~ ofrequiremellts of work, 
time, ruld intensity-- which consists of technical skill and physical efforl-- mental effort, and 
stress due to risk. During this phase of the study, only 372 unirjlle services were examined 
through the slln.:cy (Department ofHcaltb and HUlnan Services, 1991, p. 33) 
An outcome of phase one was the developmcnt of an extrapolation 
tcchnique that could be used for developing the Relative Valuc Units (RVUs) for adrlitional 
services. Prior to the close of phase one, the Harvard team, using the extrapolation 
tedmique, developed Relative Vallie Units (RVUs) for physician work for an additional 1400 
services (Department of Health and Human Services, 1991, p. 33) The extrapolation 
methods used in phase one met with criticism from the medical community upon thcir release 
(Department ofHenith and Human Services, 1991, pp. 33-34) 
Phase two ofth!: study was used to develop additional Relative Value 
Unit (R VU) vailles, and to address medical community concerns over the validity of the 
e)drapolatinn technique (Department of Health and Human Services, 1991, pp_ 33-34) Phase 
2 included an investigation of approximately fOl1l1een ne,v areas as well as a resurvey of three 
areas covered under phase one or the sludy. It was during phase two that organizations 
external to the governlnent began to take a more aggressive role in the Relative Value Unit 
(RV1:) development process hy funding additional surveys in areas such as dermatology, 
ophthalmology, pathology, ,lIld psy<.:hi,\tl)' (l)epartment ofile,\ith and Hum;tn Services, 1991, 
pp_ 33-34) 
In addition to resolving many ofthe concerns raised regarding ph;!se 
one results , one of the outcomes of phase two was the development of a method for 
determining Relative Value Unit (RVU) val\les using a small panel of physicians. In phase 
2, this "mmll group" method wa~ used to lktermine Rdativ~ Value Unit (RVU) values for 
services not developed in the phase one survey. l)uring phase 2 r~searchers found that a well-
organized stnlctured panel consisting of II to 1"1 physicians in a specialty could produce 
estimates of work that arc "quite similar" to the survey estimates (Department ofHe~lth and 
Human Services, 1(91) 
An outcome of phase 3 of the study was the use of the physician panel 
or "small group pnx.ess" to develop values for Ctment Procedure Terminology (CPT) codes 
th~t had not yet heen assigned Relative Value Units (RVUs). Additionally, phase 1 utilized 
the small group process to develop Relative Value Units (R VUs) for procedures that had 
previously been developed using the extl-~polation technique developed in pha~e l. 
The development ofpl"P'Gtie-e ~nd malprae-tice expense Relative V~lue 
Unit~ (KV1Js) w~s ~ccomplished in ~ m~llner ditTerent from that lIsed for physician expenses 
Practice expense and malpractice Kclntive Vallie Units (R VLs) instead were developed using 
historical data, as requin~d by law. TII~ Omnibus Budget Rewnciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 
1989 ~nd 1990 prcocribed that the SecretaJY ofHeal\h and Human Sl.:rvicl.:s (HHS) compute 
pmctice expense and malpractice Relmive V:lllle IJllits (R\1.h) by applying historical practice 
cost percentage data to an allowed base ch~l"ge f.x each service Physician ~xpcnsc Relative 
Value Units (R VUs) relied on all estimate or physician resources employed to provide a 
service. (Depanment offlealth and Human Services. 1901 , p_ 52. 
This legislation fUl1her required tile Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to r~vi~w the reimive values ror physician service~ at a minimum or ~very five 
years. The Secretary is also dir",ct",d to "adj\l~t the number of Relative Value Units (RVUs) 
to take into account changes in med ical practice, coding changes, ncw data on relative value 
components, or the addition ofncw proccdures"(Ocpartment of Health and Human Services, 
1991, p. 55). Changes made to the Relativc Value Units (RVUs) must be published and 
accompanied by an explanation justifYing the change. (Health and Human Services, 1991, P 
55) 
Congress did build a fiscal "f~il-s~fe" mechanism into this law to 
protect agninst signific.1nt cost growth as a resu lt (lfthe Relative Vnlue Units (RVUs) review 
and revision process Although not like ly 10 be necessary. this mechanism furnishes 
providers with a measllreof protection agai ns t downward adjustments in program costs as 
wel l. Specifically. the law requires. in part, tbat adjustments made as a result of the review 
process may not cause SupplemelllHry Medical InS\lr~nce (5MI) expenditures to "differ by 
more than $20 Illi llio n from the expenditures that wou ld have been made" had the adjustment 
not occurred (Depanment of Healt h and Human Services, 1991 , p. 55) 
(2) Geogmphic Adjustment F<1ctors (GAFs). The second component 
ofth", Medicare r",,,, Schedule (MFS) is th", set of GeogrHphic Adjustment FHctors (GAFs) 
The Geographic Adjustm"'nt Factors (GAb) are, by defini tion, w",ightect averages of the 
ind ividual Geographic Practice Cost Indexes (Gl'els) for each of the three Relative Value 
Un it (RVU) components -- physician work, nonphysician practice expense (exclusive of 
malpractice), and malpractice (Department ofHe<1lth find Human Services. 1991 , p_ 58)_ The 
Geographic Adjustment Factors (CiAFs) are used to mCHsure the differences in the cost of 
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providing care in each of these three categories based on geographical differences Rcqui red 
hy section 1848(e) of the Olnnibm Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 1990 to develop the 
Geographic Adjustment Factors (GArs), the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) elected to contract with for the Urban Insti tut e (UI) (Ina the Center for Health 
Economics Research (Cl-IER) for Geographic Adjustment Factor (GAF) development 
With reg(lrd to the developmem of the Geographic Practice Cost 
Indexes (GPCIs), the Omnibus Rudget Rcconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990 afforded the 
administration some fl exibili ty by not specifyi ng the manner in which they were to be devised 
But, as indicated in the 1991 Health Car~ Financi ng Administration's (HCFA) proposed rule 
set, apparent concern over the expense and t ime associ(l ted with developing the Geographic 
Practice Cost Indexes (GrCIs) seems to have motivated the ad minist ration to ext ract much 
of the appropriate data from existing sources (Department of Healt h and Human Services, 
199 1, pp. 58-62), When the necess~1)' data was not readily availahle, the administration used 
the substitutes that most neMly approximMcrJ the resource that they sought to measure 
(Department ofl!ealth and Human Services, 1')')1 , pp. 58-(2) 
The proposed rule for providing payment for physician scrvi<.:es, Part 
56 FR 25792, provirJes a summary orthe key resources that were considered by the staff of 
the Health Care Financing A<.:tivity (HCF A) as they deve10perJ tke Geographic Practice Cost 
Indexcs (GPels). Specifically, salient lilctol"s uscd to develop the indexes were 
• Phy~ician work: The averag~ 
sample of 1980 c~nS\lS data, 
teacher~ and engineers) with live or more years of college. Adjustments were 
made to produce a standard occupational mix in each area. The actual reported 
earnings of physicians were not used to adjust geographical differences in fees 
because these fees are, in large part , the determinants of the earnings, that is, using 
physician earnings would be "circular" 
• Employee wages: Wages of clerical workers, registered nurses, licensed practical 
nurses, and health technicians were also based on a 20 percent sample of lYHO 
census data 
• Rents: Apartment rental data produced annually by the U.S. Department of 
Hou.~ing and Urban Development were used because there were insufficient data 
on commercial rents 
• Medical equipmeru, supplies, and "O!he(' expenses: The Urban Inst itu te (Ul) and 
the Center for rlcalth Economics ReseHrch (CHER) assumed lhat this component 
average. 
Once the data had been collected and grouped according to 
dassificatioll (i,e .. physicians' work. practice expense and malpractice costs), the as.~ ociated 
geographic practice cost ind exes (GPCls) was derived using on", of two mclhods, For 
physicians' work and malpractice expense a COlllpHrison was made hetween the wliected data 
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for thl: locality and the national average. Using this information, an offset or cost index was 
identified that allowed for a ,;ystem-wide normalization of costs. For the calculation of a 
practice expen.se index, variations in employee wages, office rent, omce equipment and other 
miSl;cllaneous resources were weighted and mat hcmaticaUy combined prior to comparison to 
the national average for the data. Based on the amount of variation present, the practice 
expense index for the area um.kT consideration was defmed 
Srxtion 1&48 (e)( I) of the Social Security Act of 1965 as amended by 
the Onmibus Budget RCCQnciliatio[1 Acts (OBRAs) of 1989 and 1990 requires the Secretary 
ofl-lcaJth anu Human Services (HHS) to " I'cview, and revise if necessary, the Geographic 
Practice Cost Indexes (GrC Is) at least every three years (Department of Health and I-Iuman 
Services, 1(91) , As with changes in Relative Value Units (RVUs), adjllstmell\~ to the 
Geographic Practice Cost Indexes (GPCIs) are published in the Federal Register with the 
explanation for the change accompanying the announcement. (Health and Human Services, 
J991, p. 62) 
(3) The Conversion Factor (CF). Thc third "nd final component of 
the Medicare Fee Schcrlule (IvfFS) is thc Conversion Factor (CF). The purpose of thc 
Conversion Factor (CF) is to allow the resource based relative values for physician services 
to be converted into dollar payment amounts after application of the weighted gcographic 
adjUSlmem £1ctors. The Conversion Factor (CFj, as implied by the Medicare Fee Schedule 
(MFS) equation previously given in Figure 4, "is a single nalillnal value that must apply to all 
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~ervjces paid under the fee schedule"(Department of Health and Human Services, 1991, p 
62) 
As specified in the Omnibus Budget Reconcil iation Act (OBRA) of 
1989 as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, the initial 
value of the Conversion Factor (CF) was 10 provide a result that was budget neutral. That 
is, the Conversion Factor (CF) was to be determined so that had the fcc schedule been applied 
during 1991 it would have resulted in the same level of aggregate payments as would be made 
under the Current, Prevailing and Rea~onable (CPR) system (Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1991, p. 68) 
The determination of an appropriilte initial Conversion Factor (CF) 
value was both complex and fi5cally crit ical (Department of Health and HUlilan Services, 
1991, pp. 68-74) . Selection of an initial Conversion FaclOr (CF) th(lt was too large would 
have locked in greatt:f progr(lm costs than had existed prior to rcform and violated the legal 
requin:ment for budget neutrality. Silililarly, a Conversion Factor (CF) that was too small , 
in addition to violating law, would have locked in ineq\lities in payment levels promised 
physicians by the government during, development of the reform. Furthermore, the Medicare 
Volume Performance Standard (MVPS) update mechanism would have worked to perpetuate 
the error. There does not appear to be any provision in the l(lw for reestablishing the 
Conversion Factor (CF) baseline at a later date 
Many variables had to be considered in developing the initial 
Conversion Factor (CF) . Health and Human Services (HHS) reported that computation of 
the budget neutral Conversion Factor (CF) n:quircd "prcrJictions for CY 1991 with respect 
to: (I) fees for cacti procedure in each area (adjusted by the Geogmphic Adjustment Factor 
(GAF)), consistent with the application of the transition provision~; and (2) the frequency 
with wflich each procedure is pcrfomlcd"(Deprtrtmcnt of Health and Human Scrviccs, 1991, 
p.68). Behavioral eilects on the part of physicians and beneficiaries also had to be estimated 
The process of e~timaling the effect on volume and lIIix of services provided as a result of 
"both increases and decreases in paYlllents lor various services, standardization of coJing and 
other policies" was descrihed by Health and Human Services (HHS) to be complex 
(Department of Health and Hllman Services, 199.1, p. 73) 
The requirement for budget neutrality, as determined by the value of 
the Conversion I'actor (CF), appears to have been specified only fo[- the program's 
int.roductory year. The rate at which the value of a procedure would be allowed to grow 
would then be dctennincd by criteria specified in the Medicare Volume Pcrformance Standard 
(1-fVPS) Note that although the Conver.<.ion Factor (CF) would allow payment levels to be 
calculated tor all procedures which h(ld been ranked in a(;cordance with the Resource Based 
Relative Value Scale (RnRVS), those rates would not necessarily apply immediately. Only 
thuse services with a Currcnt, Prevailing amJ Reasonable charge (CPR) within IS percent of 
thl: Medi(;arl: Fee Schedule (!\'ITS) value would be subject to ti,e newly impll:mented ratcs 
during the introductory year. All other services would be paid in accordance with a four-year 
transition schedule that relied upon a combination of the MeLiicare Fee Schedule (Mf'S) and 
Current, Prevailing and Reasonabk (CPR) allowable charges_ (Congressional Budget OffICC, 
1990) 
(:1) :MFS Implementalion and Transition. The rules governing the 
four-year transition, 1992-1996, for the implementation of the Ivledicare Fee Schedule (MFS) 
were spccified by the Omnibus Budget Reconcili:lIion Act (OBRA) 1990 and set fonh in law 
by section 18<18(a)(2) of the Social Security Act. The transition period relies on a blend of 
CUrrent, Prevailing and Reasonablc (CPR) ~nd corresponding Medic~re Fee Schedule (JvlFS) 
rates for those sef\o·jces not covered under the Medicare Fee Schedule ("tvfFS) during the 
introductory year. The decision regarding what blcnd of rates to ~pply to ~ p~nicul~r 
procedure depends upon a comparison between lhe Medicare Fee Schedule (1\.-1J'5) rate and 
a quantity termed the Historical Pilyment na~i~ (IIPU) for a service A Historic Payment 
Basis (IIPB) was calculated for each service in ench locality bnsed primarily on 1991 
prevailing ,-,harges, adjusted \0 rcf1c'-'t inslilllcl;:S in which payment is less than the prevailing 
charge and conceptually is the average amount Mcdic31-e allows for each service in the locality 
[or 1991, updated to 19n (Congll:s~io!l,lI Dudget Office, 19()Oj '\ general description of 
the transition schedule [allows 
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CrvtfS=IIPB-15%~MFS (tor HPB values >MFS) 
C\1FS=HPB+1 S%-MFS (for HPB values <MFS) 
1992 Constrained Medicare fee Schedule (Cr-AFS) 
and Medicare Fee rates in accordance with the Medicare Volume 
Performance Standards (MVPS), the Constrained Medicare Fee Schedule rate is 
calculated as follows 
ClvfFS=(75%-AdJusted CMFS,'>'n)+(25%-Adjusted MFS amount) 
CMFS=(67%"'Adjllsted CrvlFS 1'>'JJ)+(3J%*Adjusled MFS amount) 
is calcul~led as follows 
C.MFS=(50%·Adjusted Clv1FS''>'J..)+(50%* Adjusted MFS amount) 
• 1996 Constrained Med icare Fee Schedule (CMFS) rates will no longer be 
calculated Medicare Fee Schedule rates will he in eflect for all services 
/1,jrlXi/ll1l1ll Allmllllhfl: A"II/III Chrrrgc (llfAAC) 
Section I 848(g) of Ihe Social Security Act. ~s deterrnined by the Omnibus 
Budgcl Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 1989 and 1990, established a lilllit on the amOU11l 
that nonparticipating physicians would be allowed to ehHge Medicare Pan B benefIciaries 
The purpose of the Maximum AllOwable Aetlllli Charge (MAAC) was to protect the 
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMl) enrollees acces, to care after the implementation of 
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reform. The threat of higher bnlance billing levels by phy~ic i ans who ~looJ to lose fee 
rewnuc as a result of the Medicare Fee Schedule (MT'S) and the Medicare Volume 
Performance Standard (MVPS) appears to have been the driving force for this portion of 
refonn. (Grimaldi, 1991. p. 58) 
Implementation of the Maximum Allowable Actual Charge (MAAC) was 
scheduled to take place over n three ye~r period beginning in 1991 A summary of the 
transition schedule follows 
• 1991: The physician's actual charge may nO! exceed 125 percent of the Medicare 
fee; 
• 1992: The physician's actual cha rge may not exceed 120 percent oCthe Medicare 
fee ; 
• 1993: The physician's actual clwlge may not exceed liS percent of the Medicare 
roe 
C. SUMMARY 
The Current, Prevailing and Rcasonable (CPR) payment methodology, which had been 
uscd since the introduction of Medicare, had "one overriding goal in (nind: assuring physician 
participation in a program whose passage had been veilcmc:nt ly opposed by the profession" 
(Epstein and Blumenthal, 1993 , p_ 193) . Although successflli in encouraging physician 
partil:ipation, over time the Cunent, Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) methodology came to 
be perceived as providing inappropriate incentives which contributed to "uncontrolled grov.rth 
in the cost of physician services" (Epstein and 1Jl\llllCnthal, 1993 , p 193). Under increased 
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scrutiny as a result of grovvth in prognlln costs during the seventies and eighties, the;;e 
incentives came to be identified as contributing to the growth in program expenditures 
(Epstein and Blumenthal, 1993 , p. 193) 
Cave and Vidovic have indicated that the Current, Prevail ing and Reasonable (CPR) 
methodology "came under sCi"utiny because of its inflationilry nature" (Cave and Vidovic, 
1991, p. 24). Charalterized in this manner, its practice of rewarding physicians based on past 
charges was viewed ilS providing an incentive for practitioners to raise their fees with the goal 
of obtaining higher filture eustomalY charges. The Current, Prevailing and Reasonable (CPR) 
payment method was also identified by Lee and Mitchell (Lee and Mitchell. 1994, p. 65) as 
a device lhat lockl.>(I-in inequities between procedures and treatments. From this perspective 
the Current, Prevailing and Reasonahle (CPR) methodology was characterized as having a 
tendency to "overvalue procedural services undervalue maintenance services and 
consultations and to encourage physicians to provide c~re using more elahorate and 
expensive practice systems"(Cave and Vidovic, 199 1, p. 24). Furthermore, the incentive 
structure created by the Current, Prevailing and Re~sonable (CPR) payment method was also 
credited with reductions in lhe quality of care by encollrilging the provision ofinappropriille 
and less effective procedures (Congressional Budget Office, 1986, pp. 30-33) 
The physician refonn specified in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) 
of 1989 and 1990 was designed as a response to uncontrolled grovvth in Supplementary 
Medical Insurance (5111) costs and concerns over quality and access to care. Its three major 
mechanisms for achieving change were Ihe Medicare Volume Pelfonnflnce Standard (MVPS), 
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the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS), lind the Maximum Allowable Actual Charge (MAAC) 
ru les_ The Medicare Volume Performance Standard (MVPS) functions as the primary 
mechanism for controlling the rate at which Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) 
expenditures would be allowed to grow. The Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS) was enacted to 
correct inappropriate incentives that existed as a result of the Current, Prevailing and 
Reasonable (CPR) method of payment, The last mechanism, the Maximum Allowable 
Acceptable Charge (MAAC), functions to enSlIl"C continued access to care by eliminating 
financial baniers that might arise shou ld physicians, faced with recovering less from Medicare, 
choose 10 shift the fin(lllcial bu rden to recipients in the form of balance billing.(Lee, 1990, p 
277) 
Chapter III examines the t:llvi ronmellt leaciing 10 the introduction of these three major 
mechanisms from the inst itutional ~ncl resource dependence perspectives. The go~1 of 
Chapter ill is to develop 11 greater level of understanding of the decision maki ng proce~s that 
prompted the reform effort. The Medicare Fee Schedule (lvtFS), Medicare Volume 
Pelformance Standard (MVPS) and the Maximum Allowable Actual ChlHge (MAAC) are 
rt:visitcd in Chapters IV and V where the institu tional and resource dependt:ncy theories arc 
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where: 
UFCY+ 1= Update Factor for upcoming year 
MElcY+l= Projected MEl for upcoming year 
AGcy_1= Actual growth in Medicare expenditures 
for the previous year 
DTCY_1= Default Target for the previous year 
Note: C Y = Current Year 
Figure 23. Methodology for Determination oftbe Defimlt Update Factor 
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Assumptions: 
oProjected Medicare Economic Index (MEICY' I): 5% 
oDefault Target (DTey_I ): II % 
oActual Growth in Medicare physician 
expenditures CAGeY_I): 14% 
Calculation of Default Update Factor: 
oUFCY~1 ~ MErCY' I - (AGCY_I - DTcY-]) 
5%-(14%-11%) 
2% 
l'l~ure 24, DdllUlt Tmget Method Sample CabdalllHl 
MFSs ~ [(RVUw S * GPClw A)+(RVlJpe S * GPClpc A)+ 






Physician work relative value units for 
service S. 
Practice expense relative value units for 
servicE! S. 
Malpractice relative value units for 
service S. 
Geographic Practice Cost Index for physician 
work in area A. 
GPClpe A= Geographic Practice Cost Index for practice 
GPClm A= 
expense in area A. 
Geographic Practice Cost Index for malpractice 
expense in area A. 
Conversion Factor as established by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
Figure 25 Methodology of the Mt:dlcare Fee Schedlile 
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Ill. FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM Ai'OALVSIS 
This chapter provides ~n overview of the inst.iwtionai and resource dependence 
theories oforgani7..ational behavior. Chosen for their utility in providing insight into the way 
an organization is affected by its environment, these theories or per~pectives provide the 
context under which the Medic~re Fee Schedule (MFS) is examined in Chapters IV and V. 
The discussion of these theories is not intended to be comprehensive. Only the features of 
the institutional and resource dependency theories that are employed in this analysis are 
provideJ. For sources of additional information reg~rrling these theories the reader is referred 
to the bibliography 
A. INSTITUTIONAL AND RESOUnD: DEPENDENCY THEORlES: 
COMMON ASSERTIONS 
Although the institutional <lmJ resource dependency theories ofter different 
perspectives to understand organizational beh~vio r . they do share a number of common 
assertions. Included in these asser1ions are that· a) organizations function as open systems 
(Scott, 1992, [1 . 25), b) org<lnization<ll forms <'\I"e influenced by the organization's relationship 
with its environment (Scott, 1992, p. 132). ~nd c) organizations are viewed primarily from 
the natural system perspective (Scott. 1992. pp 24-25) 
1. OIICIl Sy.~telll Nature of 01"!:~:miz:ltiolls 
Perhars one of the more concise detinitions of an open system is th~t offered in 
Boulding's (Boulding. 1956) cl~ss;flcation of system types. In his hierarchy of systems 
Boulding describes an open system as one "capable of self-maintenance based on a 
throughput ofresourees from its environment, such as a living cell"(Boulding, 1956, p. 203) 
As Boulding's definition suggests, the open system perspective ~rglles that organizations arc 
not autonomous ent.ities but instead remain depelllient ufXJn their environments for the 
resources that they require in order to survive 
In contrast, a closed system is one that does not rely upon an exchange with its 
environxnent to remain viable. It is "scparRte from its environment and comprised ofa set of 
stable and easily identified participants" (Scott, 1981, p. 22)_ By comparing these definitions 
it may be seen that the classification ofa system as open or closed is somewhat subjective in 
that it is dependent upon where the observer draws system boundaries. Specifically, as stated 
by Hall and Fagen, "whether a given system is open or closed depends on how much of the 
univer:;e is included in the system Rnd how much in the environment' (Hall and Fagen, 1956, 
pp_ 18-28) 
2. Org:-.nizfltions flS PI·odllctS of Theil' Environments 
In both the instit\ltion~1 anrl resource del.lendency theories the environment is accepttd 
as a primary factor in the determination and maintenance of organizational form, This 
acceptance is illustrated by viewpoints conveyed hy Brint and Karabel (I 'J'JI, rr ]]7-360) 
and by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
From lhe institUlional perspective Erint and Karabel reaffirm "the idea that 
organizati(ln~, mur;h lik'" biologir;al species, 'adapt' to their environments" and that 
organizations "slJI>-'ive if they fit into niches in the ecology of existing organizations'· (Erint 
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and Karabel, 1991, pp_ 348-349), Pfeffer and Salancik divide the environment into two 
dimensions, the enacted and unheeded anu maintain that, with regard to the resource 
dependency perspective, "although organizational decisions are determined by the enacted 
environment organizat ional outcomes can (also) he afTected by parts of the environment 
not noticed or heeded" (Pfeffer lind Salancik, 1978) Thi~ argument differs fro m that 
presented by the rational perspect ive. (Scutt, !992) 
From the rational perspective organizational stnlClurcs arc viewed a~ funct ional in 
nature (Scott, 1992, pp 29-50), The ral ional perspective holds that organizational structures 
are determined internally wi th the speciiic intent of coordinati ng and supporting 
organizational Components in tile conduct of the mission of the organizations (Scott , 1992, 
pp_ 29-30). 
Although the institutional and resource dependency theories agree that the 
environment is the fundamental innuence for determining organizational structurc, they differ 
in their view of the manner in which the process takes place (Zucker, 1')77, pp_ 726-745) 
Fundamentally, institutional theory argucs that organizational structures are concerned 
primari ly wi th survival and that their opportunities for success increase as they acquire 
legi timacy (DiMaggio, 198R, p. n Legitilllacy is itl1portant to an organization because, as 
stated by Meyer and Scott (tvteyer nnd Scott, 1983, p. 20 1), "organizational legitimacy refers 
10 the degree of cultural sUfJport fOf an organization"_ Furthermore, "organizati ons thai 
incorporate societal ly legitimated f;nionalized elements in theif forma l struc tu res maximize 
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their legit imacy and increase their re~ource~ and slilvival capabilities' (Meyer and Rowan, 
1992, p. 34) 
Resource dependency theory, however. views organizational structure as an outcome 
of the organization's effort to adapt to influences communicated through linkages with its 
environment (Scott, 1992). Reso\l rce dependency, a~ its name impl ies, considers the effect ive 
management of these environmental linkages as the key to ensuring organizational survival 
Furthcnnore, resource dependency theory suggests that in dense organizational networks, 
such as those fou nd in political environments. that "interests become entwined and 
intercOlUlccted" (pfeffer and Salancik. 1978, p. J 88). Specifically, in a political environment, 
Pfeffer and Salancik suggest tha t "the feasibi li ty of coord inating int erests, under such 
circumstances diminishes, and the possibility of absorbing al l the necessary interdependencies 
disappears completely" (Pfeffer and Salancik . 1978 , p. 18 8) These conccpts will be more 
fully developed in the discu ssion of the theories that fo llows 
3. Natunll System Perspective 
Two (jualities that are present in most organizations may be associated with the 
rational and natu ral systems perspectives. T he rational systems perspective hold s that "an 
organization is a collectivity orient ed to the pursuit of reialively specific goals and exhibit ing 
a relatively highly formal ized social stnIC\1.lre" (Scott, 1981, p. 20) . Conversely, the natural 
system perspect ive views an organization as "a collectivity whose participants are litt le 
affected by the formal stn.lcture or oflicial goals but who share II common intcrest in the 
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survival of the system and who eng~ge in collective ~ctivit i e~, inform~ l l y structured, to secure 
this end" (Scott, 1981, p. 22) 
Institutional and resource dependency theories argue that in organizations the natural 
system perspective assumes a dominant role over behavior suggested hy the rational 
perspcctive. A:; observed by Selznick, forma l structu res cannot overcome the import~nce of 
behavior that from an economic perspective is not strictly rat ional (Selznick. 1948) 
B. INSTITUTIONAL THEORV 
Inst itutional theory suggests that 'organizations are created hy the developmcnt and 
elaboration of institutional mles and bdi~fs as well as by structural or rclational complexities" 
(Scott, 198 1, p. 141). Although this theo:)' recognizes that o rganizations are ~ product of 
both in sti tutional and rational factors , it ho lds that the institutional rules and beliefs o r 
"rationalized myths" present in the environ ment HTe the dominant force th~t determines and 
maintains the stnlcture of the organization (Meyer and Rowan, J 983, p. 148) 
Institutional organizations ~ re unlike rational organizations which are task specific and 
may be disassembled upon task completion . Instead , the very nature o f institutionalizat ion 
"deals wi th the persistence and perpet1.l~tion or activity" (PfeITer, 1')82, p_ 239). Therefore, 
the organization adheres to r~tionalized myths present in the environment because thc myths 
communie~te the stand~rd to whi ch the o rganization must conform in order to acquire 
legitimacy and increase its pOlerlt i ~t for ;;\Lrviv~1 
An organization's conformance to that specified by the environment is known as 
institutional isomorphism The manncr in which isomOl-phism comes to be and the factors that 
influence organizational success are presented in Meyer and Ruwan's (Meyer and Rowan, 
1978, p. 353) mode! describing organizational smviva\. The model is given in Figure 26 
The process embodied in the model begins with the elaboration of rat ionalized 
institutional myths in the organization's environment Organizations seeking to survive must 
achieve conformity with the rationalized institutional myths present in its environment 
Confonnity allows the organization seeking survival to "become legitimated by environmental 
institutions" (Meyer and Rowan, 1978, p. 352) Legitimacy in turn allows the organization 
to acquire the scarce resources needed for survival. Key concepts associated with the 
Organizational Survival Model are discussed in greater detail as follows 
Legitimacy 
As suggested by rrelrer and Sa lancik, "legitimacy is bound up with social 
norms and values; and while it is not correlated perfectly with either law or economic 
viability, it bears some relationship to both" (PfetTer and Salancik, 1978, p. 193) The 
relationship depicted in Figllre 26 demonstrlttes that in addition to scarce resources, the 
acquisition of legitimacy is also critical to organizational survival. It lollows then that an 
organization, in its effort to maximize irs survival potential, will adopt an organizational 
stmcture and practices that arc consistent with those norms and values being signaled by its 
envirunment. This behavior further implies that legitimacy is generally recognized by 
organizations as an externally conferred status which is commonly believed to be 
retrospective in nature. [t is an external qlla[ity because it is bestowed on an orgnnimtion no! 
from within but by its envirOllment I\lso, legitimacy, viewed as a retrospective quality, 
"implie~ that an organization reviews its past actions and output$ in the context of current 
societal values and interest s" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, pr- 194-195) 
b. Isomorphic Processes 
Within the context of institutional theory, isomorphism refers to the trenu 
toward structural similarity between organizations in an environment. It is assumed in 
institutional theory that an o rganization rcsponus to environmental signals regarding 
legitimate bcha\~or by adapting its organizational structure and policies to conform to societal 
myths and symbols in order to maximize its prospect for survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1<)<)1). It follows then that a popUlation of org<lllizalions existing within an environment and 
conforming to the same signals sho\llrilldopt similar stnlCtures and policies. Institutional 
theory proposes tha t this isomorphic process may take place in one or a combination of three 
ways, coercively, mimetically or nOI-matively (DiMaggio and Powell, 199 1, p. 67) 
(I) Coercive Isomorphism As its name implies "coercive 
isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by 
others in the environment ).Ipon which the focal organization is dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organizations function" (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, p. 67)_ Examples of environmental influence measures that contribute to coercive 
isomorphism include the imposition of legislatively mandated programs, economic 
inducemen ts by community and other special interest groups, and societally implied 
requirements for an organization to act to sListain its legitimate status.(DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, p. 67) 
81 
(2) Mimctic Isomorphism. Mimetic isomorphism may result when an 
organization is faced with environmental uncertainty.(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) 
Spe(;ifi(;ally, when an organization does not understand change~ taking pla(;c in its 
environment it may choose to adopt a structure and policil;.':s ~imilar to those bei ng used by 
other organizations elsewhere in the environment By choosing to adopt structures and 
policies that it perceives as successful it is able to mitigate its risk relative to other 
organizations present in the environ ment.(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) For example, many 
U.S. industrial organizations responded in this manner in the late eighties when Japanese 
indust ry began to increase its market share in industries such as automobile manufacturing and 
electronics. Sensing the need to act as a result of erod ing market shares, but not fully 
understanding the reasons for Japanese success, U.S. automobile and electronics 
manufi\(;turers responded by implementing programs ~ul;h as Total QUlllity Management and 
by mod ifYing their organizations and practices in ways that mimicked their relatively more 
successful competitors 
(3) Nonnative Isomorphism Normative isomorphism result~ from 
pressure being exened ,\~ a result of environmental standardization and 
professionalization.(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, pp. 70-74) Both of these processes define 
a range of behaviors and practices a society will accept as legi timate_ Federal, state, and 
coalition-sponsored programs for professional registration and licensing lead to normative 
isomorphic behavior on thc palt of organi<:ations and individuals.(DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, pp_ 70-74) Because of normative isomorphism hospitals require that doctors possess 
certain minimum credentials before they are al lowed to practice Similarly, before being 
accepted by an environmenl as legitimate, lawyers mUS1 pas~ the bar examination, engineers 
must complete the professional registration process and members of tradcs. such as 
electricians, must be licensed. Consequently, organi7,ation~ seeking to maintain their 
legitimacy will be likely to employ only those individuals who have satisfied the requirements 
prescribed by professions and standards accepted by the cnvironmenL(DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, pp. 73-74) 
S('C Propo.,-ilionJ /)c.w:rihiuJ; In still/lional Behfll'ior 
Although this analysis makes use of m(lny aspccts of institutional theory, il 
makes freque nt reference to Meyer and Rowan's (Meyer and Rowan, 1978, [Jp. 345-359) six 
propositions for examining the emel-gence ~l1d beh~viors of organiz~tions as institutions 
within an environment The proposal~ ~re as fo llows 
I. As rat ionalized institutional rules ~rise in given dom~ins of work 
formal organizations form and expand by incorporat ing these rules as 
elements 
• Proposition 3 
elements in 
resources and survival capabilities 
• Proposition 4 Because attempts to control and coordinate activities in 
institutionalized organizations le~d 10 conflicts and loss of legitimacy, elements of 
structure arc decouplcd from activities and from each other 
8J 
• Proposition 5 The more an structure is derived fj-om 
institutionalized the lTlore it elaborate displays of confidence, 
satisfaction, and imernally and externally 
C. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY 
L Genenli Description 
As described by PfeITer, "resource deperulem::y theory suggests that organizational 
behavior becomes cxternally influenccd because the focal organization must attend to the 
demands of those in its cnvironmcnt that pl"Ovidc resourccs necessary and important for its 
continucd survival" (Pfeffer, 1982, p_ \(3) In addi tion to considering the constraints 
imposed on an organization by its environmental links, rcsource dependency also places value 
on examining the marmer in which internal organiz'ltional decision making impacts the 
organization's ability to adapt to its environment. Although hoth internal and external factors 
arc considered imponant to the resollrce dependency perspective, the dominant intluencc in 
determining organizational form and procedu re will be that originating in the environment 
In this manner thc organizational form is determincd when key internal decision makers, 
responding to thc external stimuli. craft an organizational form capable of managing the 
environmental linkages 
The context suggested by resO ur-ce depemiency theo r-y may be understood hy 
considering the propenies of an organizations as seen from the open system perspective. In 
an open system there ilre no org~nizariol1s that exist in a purely ~utonoll1ous state. 
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Consequently, an organization TIllist depend, to various degrees, on the relationships that exist 
between it~drand the suppliers of scare resources and consumers oflhe organization's output 
for its continued survival The linkage~ suggested by these dependencies provide the ba.~is 
for the political , business and social re lationships that must be managed for the focal 
organizations to succeed 
Resource dependency suggests that an organization will seek to manage 
environmental relationships by minimizing dependence on them and thus mitigating threats 
to i t~ survival. The management of these depelldencies is viewed as being accomp1i~hed by 
using internal and external coalitions 
2. hnportance, ofhlllivitluais ilL Effcctillg Change 
Resource dependency theory suggests tbat individuals within an organization wiU 
"attempt to manage their external dependellcics. both to ensure the survival of the 
organization and to acquire, if possible, InOI-e autclIIollly and freedom from external 
constrain!" (Pfeffer, 19H3, p. Ie)]). There ue primarily two ways in which individuals act 
to eHect change in an orgallizatioll 1) as managers or kcy decision makers and 2) as internal 
coalitions 
Role of Mllnt1J.:ellll!l1/ 
(1) Management' s Symbolic Capacity Resource dependency views 
managers as having a rdatively important role in an organization . First, managcrs are seen 
as having a symbolic dimension. This perspective proposes that the manager is "a symbol of 
the organization and its success or faLiure. a scapegoat, and a symhol of personal or individual 
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control over social actions and outcomcs" (Pfetrer and Salancik, 1978, p_ 263)_ In this 
capacity organiLations are given the appearance of being un der the control of individuals, a 
<.:ondition that other dimensions of resource dependency indicate is unlikely to exist to a 
signifi<.:ant extent 
In addition to the symbolic capacity of management, the rituals and 
ceremonies employed when changes are effected in the management team are also important 
to the organization. For example, devices such as instalbtion ceremonies are used to facilitate 
public acceptance ofthe individual 
The utility of managers from this perspective lies not in their ability to 
directly effect organizational changes but in the riluals and symbols associated with their 
offke. As suggested by Pfeffer and Sa lancik, "important social funct ions are served by thc 
manipulation of symbols" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 17)_ For example, the need for 
change in an organization may be signaled by the replacement of a key management official 
Similarly, personal traits that the organizations seeks to reinforce Inay be communicated by 
offering a meritorious promotion to an individual dcmonstrating those traits 
(2) Management's Active Role. In addition to their symbolic role 
management is also viewed hy resource dependency th(!of)' as having an active quality 
Managers, in an active sense, are considered as havillg ut il ity hecause of their ability to: I ) 
take action to influ ence the conditions of the organizations environ ment and 2) serve the 
organization by making a dctcrmination of the actual state ofthc existing cnvironment 
S6 
Resource depem!tncy theory recognizes thaI many of the constraints 
encountel-ed hy an orgilnizlItion do not occur natura!]y in its environment. That is, many of 
the const.raint~ that exist are the product of coalitions g.tining the I-equisite wcial support 
needed to put the: constraint in place. Oec<luse this lype or constraint is a social construct, it 
foHows lhal managers may be able to act on behalf of the organization by gaining support for 
removing or modii)'ing the constraint. In thi~ capacity management is ahle to work actively 
toward the successful mamlgcmel1t of the innuence meaSllre be it internal or external in 
The second function ,,1' m~:l~gcrial ~ction contained within this 
perspective is that of recognizing the social context in which the organization exists. This is 
a prerequisite to the organiziltion's et1011 ofm,\llaging the power relationship inherent in its 
linkages to its environment. b this capacity management must not only focus on those issues 
related to obtaining physical resources bllt they al.,o must seek to be aware of power 
relationships existing within a social context 
h. Ro/~ of Indil'il/I/flls 
Individuals ill an organinltiol1 provide the huilding blocks of the inlemai 
coalitions that mll~t fonn in order to effect the chi1nge required by an orgi1nization as it seeks 
to adllpt to disturbances in its environment, Coaliiions are ihe mechanisms for achieving 
change in an organi,wtion, As sugge,ted by Thompson (1')67), it is the uOll1inant coalition 
ill an orgalliLation that is the body that rietermincs the "official'· dil-ection of the orBi1llization 
The process of forming and maintaining a dominant coalition is "a dynamic one, ~ubject to 
perturbation and change" where "even in the most bureaucratic organizations there is an 
"undercurrent of bargaining, jockeying for position, and alliance formation that creates 
potential for change regardless of the organiz.ation's official strategy and stated position" 
(Kanter, et aI., 1992, p. 47) This process ofinternnl influencc is also described by Pfeffer and 
Salancik in that, "organizations, in addition to being coalitions of intercsts, are markets in 
which influence and cont rol arc transacted" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p_ 259) 
Although individuals are imponant influences on organizational behavior, 
resource dependency theory holds that their impact is generally considered to be less 
dominant than environmental efteets. Pfeffer and Salancik altribute this quali ty to 
contributions from three factors: I) em~cts caused by the leadership selection process, 2) 
individual discretionary limitations and J) the occurrence of events beyond the control of the 
individual (Pfeffer and Salancik. 1978, pp_ 6~ 1 0) 
The manner in which organiz.ational policies and leader select ind ividuals for 
promotion terlds to lead to 11 homogeneous set of skills in the organization 's body of key 
deci sion makers_ It is this homogeneity that may result in loss of breadth and diversity in 
organizational leadership skills. As a result, management's range of possible responses to 
changing environmental conditions is likely to hecome constrained relative to a leadership 
chosen for thei r broad range of style, skil ls and pel"spectives, (PfefIer and Salancik, 1978) 
Individual discretionary limitations must be considered when examining the 
role of the individual in effecting (lrganizatiollHI chHnge, Constraints on the Hbility of 
individuals to exert thei r will are encolilitered at all leve ls in an organization, Even when 
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individuals adtieve high level po~i tions thtre are ~tilllimitations placed on their discretion to 
a<.:\. For example, politicians must answer to their constitutncy just as chief executivl;; offictr~ 
must answtr to shareholders. J .irnitati(lIls on discretion mily take on tormal and informal 
constraints. Fonnallimitations may be achieved through measures .,uch a~ the implementation 
of rigid bureaucratic requin:ment'; while inti.,rlllallimitations m~y take less obvious form~ 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
Thc ability of <tn individual to efTect change may also be limited by action~ 
taking place in the environment that Me beyond th~t illdividual's control. Factors such as the 
effects of matcrial shortilges, acts or Cioei, ami labor strikes at supplier ope[ation~ are all 
examples of environmental elTects that individual acti0n may not be able 10 mitigate 
Intemally, individuals serving a~ manager~ rn~y fino that though i~sues ~ueh as ~ subordinate 
employee or nnvorker'g general health. state of mind. or· lllOOd may have an impact on 
operations, they, a~ managers, have little control ClW'r their occurrence or outcome. (Pfeffer 
and Salancik. 1978) 
3, Till! t:nvironmcnt: A ContcxtllalPcrSjlcctivc 
Re~O\1rce dependency theory argues that tr.e dominant intlliences that determine what 
form and policies an organiullion is likely to ~jClpt are determined by internal response~ to 
stimuli originating in the environment This section examines the nature oftheS(; infhlcnce 
measures a~ they rdate to org.1niLational effectiveness, ellkiency, ~ensitivity and internal and 
external constraints 
W) 
Effectiveness find E(fidellcy 
Assuming that the sun:ival of an organization is important to its rnl;;mbers, the 
mmmer in whic11 it chooses to adapt to change is critical to the likelihood of its success. As 
stated by Pfeffer and Salancik, "survival comes ",hen the organization adjusts to, and copes 
with, ib environment, not only when it makes effll.;ient inttrnal <Luju~trnents" (Pfeffer anu 
Salancik, 1978, p. 11). This point alludes to the importance of being able to distinguish 
between the diflcrences in these two concepts 
Eflecliveness is genernlly viewed ns an external measure of the quality of an 
organization's response to its environment It is a concept that considers not only how well 
the organization is pursuing n pnrticulnr task but also whether the task is an approprintc 
cour~e of action for the organization. (Pfdfet" and Salancik, )978) 
Efficiency is taken to be an internal measure, it considcr~ how wcll the 
organization is carrying out a particulnr task or set of tasks, I.t is important to note that 
eiRciency docs not consider whether the COIII-se ofnction being undertaken hy an orgnnization 
i~ appropriate hut only whether the output being pmduced justifies the quantity of resources 
being (.:onsumed, (pfetTer and Salancik 1(78) 
From a reSotlrce dependency pelspective, the organizalion that has the greatest 
likelihood o[succeeding is the one lhal responds to eXlernal influences in a manner consislenl 
with the concept of efTectivenes,. Th~t i" t he preferred 'H.:tion calls for (.:hoosing an 
~d~pt.ation strategy thaI considers the IISeflllrleSS of actions being taken in the context ofthe 
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environment rather than relying solely on how well internal activities ,II-e being conductlCd 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 19n) 
Efiective managcnwnt of the links that tic an organization to its environmtnt, 
in the context previollsly presented, is vel)' important to an organization's effort to continue 
to survive Although resource dependency theol)' stresses the importance of responding to 
the demands of the environment, it also addresses the need for an mganiz,ltion to 
appmpi-iateiy sensitin itself to its environment Thefre'luency and intensity orthe various 
stimuli received from the environment Illwy be continuous, divel-se and potentially conflicting 
Responding to every stimuli could resl:lt in a very unstable organizational stmclurc 
InSle~d. Ol-.,\~nizations mip;ht benetit by adopting pt-actices that would allow 
them to filter out some of the external influences. Guidelines describing the manner in which 
this may be accomplished are suggested hy Pfeffer and ~alancik, They describe wn conditions 
that affect the extent to which an organization would comply with cxtemal demands (pfeffe,r 
and Salancik, 1978, p, 44), They are as f~lliows 
• The focal organization is aware of the demands 
• The focal org~nization obtains some reSOlJl-CeS i"mill the social actor making the 
demands 
• The resource is a critical or imponant part of the focal organization's operations 
• The social actor controls the all oem ion_ access, or lise of the resource; alternative 
sources for the resource are not availahle to the focal orl!aniz~tion 
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its is interdependent 
does not control the dtlermination, formulation, or 
aClOr'sdemands 
• Thc foced organiZeltion is capelble of developing actions or outcome~ that will 
satisfy the extemal demands 
• The focal organization desires to survive 
Without adopting an appmpi-iate level of ~en~itivity, an organization would 
be likely to find itself in a perpetually reactive state instead of focusing on actions that 
contribute to long-term etrectiveness Organizations may employ numerous measures to 
allow them to filter the effects of the environment Many of the most readily observable 
involvc some form of structurally adaptivc rcsponsc. for cXC\Jnplc, a congressman may 
surround herself or himself with layers of staff assistRnts and require that they deal with 
routine issues and divel1 those oflittle consequence 
In addition to considering the appropriate level of environmental sensitivity, 
the organization must select the practices it will lise to perceive and interpret its environment 
This choice i~ important because reality from a resuurce dependency perspective is taken to 
be subjective in mllure, ConseCJuently, the wbilt, where, why and how of gathering 
environmental information becomes significant undertakings 
Internal ami Ex:tcrna/ C()nstrninl,~ 
Constraints are defined by Pfeffer and Salalleik as conditions in the 
environment that ensure lhal responses to a situation are not random (Pfeffer and Salam;ik, 
1978, p. 15), Though often perceived as an impediment to exercising fcc will, constraints 
may also provide the organization with direction 
Internally, constraints may be dcsigned to £llide action and decision making 
in a manner that supports the organization'S effectiveness strategy. Externally, the 
organization may look to a numher of eonstmints as guideposts for determining the range of 
acceptable behavior within its environment 
D. SUMMARY 
Because of the importance of legi timilcy and the organizational environment to 
political organizations, the institllt ion?.1 and rCSOllrce dependelKY theories arc able to provide 
significant insight regarding the manner in which they behave, Using these theories Chapters 
IVam\ V examine the roles of Congress and othel' appropriate government organiZations as 
they relate to physician payment reform as specified in lhe Oillnibus Budget Reconciliation 






Figure 26 Meyer and Rowan' s Organizational Smvival Model. (Meyer and Rowan, 
1978, p. 353) 
IV. REFORM ANALYSIS- THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
As a policy, the :vIedicare Fet: Scht:dule (MFS)-- a mandate by Congress, its 
development influenced by many organi;mtions, and its execution dcpendent upon the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)-- doe.'; nOllend itself directly to analysis 
using the tools offered by organizational theory. Consequently, an institutional and resource 
dependency examination of policies and actions resu lting from the implementation of the 
Medicare Fee Schedule (r...1FS) must be conducted re lative to some focal organization The 
focal organi lation selected for use in th is analysis is the Department of Health and Human 
Service.'; (DHHS) 
This analysis begins with a description of the foc?1 organization, thc Dcpartment of 
Health and Human Servict:s (Dlil-lS) Hnd its subordinllte agency, the Hcalth Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA). A model of the Health and Human Services (HHS) environment is 
then introduced, idcntifying and dt:scribing organizat ions that havt: taken an active role in 
health care reform. Following this model, the concept of hyper pluralism is introduced and 
re lated 10 the organiZ<ltions active in physician paymt:nt rt:fonn The chapter concludes with 
a chronology of salient events in the dt:velopmcnt and impl ementation of physician payment 
reform, with emphasis on the interaction between the Department of Health and Human 
Services (OHHS) and organizations present in its environment. In the next chapter, the 
institutional lind resource dependency theories are applied to events described in the 
chronology in order to gain an understanding ofisslle~ and actions associated with physician 
payment reform. 
A. }<'OCAL ORGANTZA TTON 
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is an executive agency within 
the federa l government. It describes it self as "the United States government's principal 
agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essent ial human services, 
especially for those who are least allie to help themselves' (Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1995, World Wide Weh Home Page) 
The Department comprises four operating divisions I) the U.S. Public Health Sen'-ice, 
2) the Administration for Children and Fanlilies. 3) the Administration on Aging and 4) the 
Health Care Financing Administ ration (HCFA). Thc Heali h Care Fina ncing Administrat ion 
(HCFA) plays the predominant role in the administration of the Medicare program 
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) was established on March 8, 1977, 
approximately cleven years aner the introduct ion of Medicare The purpose of creating this 
agency was "to (.:ombine under aile admini~tratio n the oversight of the Medicare program and 
related quality assurance activilies"(Department of Health and Human Services, 1995, World 
Wide Web Home Page) . In fiscal year 1993 . the Health Care Fi nancing Administration 
(HCFA) served "67 million people, or one in fO LI T elderly. disabled and poor Americans 
through Medicare and Medicaid"(Depan ment of Health and Human Servi(.:es, 1995, World 
Wide Web H ome Page) 
An ~dditional diml.:nsion oftlndersti1nding the Health Carl.: Fillflllcing Administrati()n 
(HCFA) may be gained by considl.:ring its ol'ganizationai mission statement and vision for the 
future. In pnrt, the Health Care Financing Administrati(ln (HCrA) has articulated its 
organizational role as follows: 
Addressing the filture of the organization. the IIealth Care financing Administration (HefA) 
vision statement 
B. COMPOl\'El\'TS OF THF FOCAL ORGANJ7.i\TlON ENVIRON\fENT 
A review of the literature indicates a number of organizations were active in 
physician payment reform. Con~equently, li:e ol'ganizalions selected for inclusion into the 
model oflile j)epal1m~nt ofH~alth ami Human S ~rYices (D1 rrlS) mgilt1izatioll~l ellvironment 
is not comprehensive but intended 10 give the readl:f an appreciati0n for the number and 
diversity 0fth()se active in payment rl:forl11 
The environment ~ulTounding the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
may be depicted graphically in the manner sl!ggested by Bryson's Stakeholder Map fo r a 
Government (Bryson, 1988, p. 102), Bryson's model is presented in Figure 27 
An adaptation of the Bryson model, incorporating the Department of Health and 
Human Services (Dl-llIS) as the focal organiZiltion, is presented in Figure 28 . Because orthe 
large number ororganizations active in the Health and Human Services (HHS) environment 
and the need fo r clarity or presentation, the mode! depicted in Figure 28 presents only groups 
of organizations Organizations incl uded within each group and a brief descrip tion of their 
position regardi ng health care reform fo llows 
1, Medical AssociatioilS 
In excess of twelve different medical associations representing numerous physicians' 
groups in various c(lpacities took an act ive interest in the development (lnd administrat ion of 
the Medicare Fcc Schedule (tvfFS), (Department of Health and Human Services, 1991, pp 
1-179) A brief description of these orgMizations fol lows . 
• American Academy of Family Physicians (AMP): Represents 74,000 physicians 
Sllppons some sort of!i mit on physicians' fees. (Rich, \992, p. 4) 
• American Academy of Pediatrics Supports henlth insurance coverage for all 
children and pregnant women, \Vants to contain costs lly requiring consumers to 
pay premiums, deduclih!es, and coinSllra!1CC and by emphasizing prevcntive carc 
(Lieberman, 1993 , p, 37) 
and 
i, 
disease prevention through 
l cader~hip in the development of 
in the formlilation of hcalth care policy (American 
C"III_""""'",I;;"I",,, 1995. World Wide Web Home Page) 
• Amcncan College of Physicians: Represents 77,000 specialists in internal mcdicine 
Supports a national health care budget and negotiated fee schedu les for doctors 





a range of health care 
• American Society of Anesthesiologists An educatio nal and 
association wi th a mcmbership in excc% of 34.000. (American of 
Anesthcsiologists. 1995, \Vorld Wide Web Home Page) 
l{cpresent~ approximately 15 ,000 
internists (u"PI. 1993, Domestic 
total health care spending and a 
Domestic News) 
2. Hospital Representative Orgl1lli1;Htiuns 
Though hospital representative urganizatiun~ are not traditionally associated with 
Medicare Part n services, they do serve to represent physician~ and other health care 
providers in numerous other capacities. Because of the potential for hospital representative 
organizalion~ t.o either directly or indirecily influence key decision maker~. they Ilave been 
incorporated into the model Examples and a brief description of hospital rcpn;scntativc 
organization~ follow 
• Federation of American Heallh Systems: !{epre~ents health 
I'ree-rnilrke\ to 
(Lieberrnall. 37) 
3. Citizen and Consnmer Gronps 
As indicilted by the discllssion of citizen gltlllpS in the literature. including transcripts 
pertaining to the physicinn payment reform cffo[-L these groups appear to have played an 
active role in the process Exaillpies of these gmups and the nntllre of their involvement 
follow 
100 
• Ament:.<U! Association ol" Retired Persons: Represents 34 mi llion Americans over 
age 50. (Buni ~, 1993, p Advocates health care for all and improvements in 
Medicare and Medicaid health info rmation, sells insurance, 
and operates a mail-order pharmilcy for members. (Lieberman, 1993, p. 37) 
• Citizen Action A federation of32 state citizen organizations that work on health 
care, energy, ilnd cnvi ronmentill isslles 37) Coalition 
includes groups consisting oflabor and 
by replacing health insurance compilnies a government agency to collect 
premiums and pay claims. (Linsalata, 1902, p. 6B) a Canadian-style 
health care system Makes avai lable research (Liebennan, 
1993, p. 37) 
• Consumers Union: Publishes ConSllmcr Reports. ra tes insurance policies, and 
lobbies for health care reform and other issl les of interest to consu mers. Supports 
Makes ilvilililule art icles pub lished in Consumer Reports 
p.37) 
• Families USA: Lobbies for ilffordilble 1ong-term care, heil\th cale for everyone, and 
for older Americans. Conducts studies and issues reports 
selv ice fo r the press. (Lieherman, 1993, p. 37) 
• Health Access: A California Coal it ion including unions, re ligious, and consumer 
Advocates access 10 comprchcnsive health heneflts, 
1993 , p. 37) 
Conducts research on various health care 
Cl Uil lity, safety, and 
Ullnecessary surgery. Supports a single-payer system 1993, p. 37) 
4. Insurance GnJUps and l.obbil's 
Exampies of gro\lp~ represent ing the inSllra nce industry during the reform process 
include the following 
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• Health Insurance Association of America: Major lobbying organization for 270 
health insurance companies. Provides statistical information on health insurance 
Supports managed care arrangements and a requirement for all to 
provide health insurance for employees 
(Lieberman, 1993, p, 37) 
employer mandate. (Bunis, 
• Blue Cross Blue Shield Association 
organmltions. Scppcn"n,"g"d 
provide healt h insu rance fo r workers. 
5. Mflnllged Care I'I'oviders 
Examples oftive managed carl! pl"Ovidel' organization representatives are given below 
Represents Preferred Providel 
• lnt erStudy: Publishes a directory of HJv10s and hllS dllta on the HMO industry 
(Lieberman, 199], p. ]7) 
• Group Health Associlltion of Americll: Represems more than 400 of the nll tion's 
550 l-{MOs. O'ricdcn, 19\>2, Conducts resellrch (lnd h(ls reports, periodicals, 
1993, p. 37) 
Represents 11 4 Illrge compllnies interested in 
Conducts research on heal th outcomes 
• National Committl!e for QUlllity Assll rance An independent, non-profit insti tu tion 
that reviews and accredits health maintenance organizations and other managed 
care plans. purpose is 10 foster development of internal systems for 
continuous modeled aner the Deming methods, (Wojcik, 
1991 , p. 1) (Lieberman, 
1993, p. 37) 
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inc1urle 
6. Think T:mks :lIld Rescm'ch Groups 
Examples of academic and research organizations active in physician payment reform 
• Employee Benefit Research Institute: A 
organi7.ation that conducts studies and 
utilization, cost containment, health care 
heal th financing. (Lieberman, 1993 , p. 37) 
• Rand Corporation: Condu(;ts stud ies on health issues such as quality ofeare anrl 
medical appropri~teness (Lieberrnan, 1993, p. 37) 
• The Brookings Instit\ltion Conducts resean.:h on ferlcral health care issues and 
health slich as Medicare, Medicaid, and long-term care (Lieberman, 
1993, p 
10J 
investigates socia! and 
Maintains a heal th poli(;y 
7. Medical Equipment Mllilufacturers 
An example of an organization representing medical equipment manulacturers follows 
• Health lndustry M<lnuf~cturt..'fS Associat ion: Represents rnaker~ of medical devi ce ~, 
diagnostic prociucts, and health care infon1l(\1 ion systems_ Lobbies and conducts 
educational seminars. (Lieberman, 199], p, ]7) Membership comprises only 300 
of the more than 2,000 medical dl'Vice venciOl'S nationwide_ (Wagner, 1993, p_ 12) 
8. Pharmaceutical COnllJallies 
Examples oforganizalions represent ing the interests of pharmaceu tical manufactu rers 
include: 
• Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association. Represents 75 V.S. makers of 
over-the-coll nter drugs (Colhurn, 1093, p Z0) Has materials on cost 
eH"cctiveness of over-t he-cOllnter drugs_ (Lieherman, 1993, p. 37) 
• Pharmaceutical Manuf<lcturers Association: Represents drug companies that 
develop and manufacture prescription drugs. Supports comprehensive prescription 
drug coverage in required benefit package and managed competition wi thout price 
controls on pharmaceuticals. (Lieberman, 1993. p. 37) 
9, Fo\mdatiOIlS 
Examples offollndations arid the manner in which they have participated in the health 
care rcfoml environment follow 
• The Commonwealth Fund A naliona l 
research on health, education, and 
• The I lenry J. Kaiser Fami ly Foundat ion: Awards grants and conducts research on 
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health <Ind public health issues such ~s rcproduct ive health and AlDS 
(Lieberman, p.37) 
• The Robert Wood Johnson foundat ion : Awards grants and conducts research on 
loo£,-"on '"co, cO>t<"o,,';omcot, and substance 
10. Unions 
The AFL-CIO was selected as an example of union involvement in the physician 
payment reform process because the federiltion is composed of appro xi mal ely seventy-five 
affi liated unions. EXllmples of AFL-CIO union afli lia tes include' a) Air Line Pilots 
Associat ion. b) United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of 
America International Union, c) International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and d) 
International Brotherhood of Teamst el"s A brief descl ip!ion oflhe federation fol lows 
11. Employer Groups 
Business was represented in the he.1lth c~re reform process in a number of different 
ways. In addition to the direct lobbying of key decision makers by company representatives. 
a numb er of coali tion groups was formed E,,,,mples of business and business coalit ion 
groups active in physici an payment rerann are given below 
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200 of the nation's largest 
limits on both tax deductibility and 
tax exclusion for health bendl!s. (Wagner, 1993, p 25) 
• National Associ;Hion of Manllf~etllrers: Represents 12,500 manllfaellircrsand 
and 
• l\ational Smitll Business L'niled Represents 65,000 small husinesses many of 
which fewer than 20 workers_ Opposes requireml:nts that 
insurance. SupporlS ins\lr~nce reform and managed 
1993, p. 37) 
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12. Government Organizlltions 
Government organizations that had a role in the development and initial exc(;Ution of 
physician payment reform thaI are extemallo the Deparllnent of Health and Human Services 
(m-ms) indude 
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• Sen ate Labor and Human Resources Committee: fIas jurisd iction over heal th 
insuranl:e Icgislat ion, mcntal he~ l th, medicnl devices, public health, and fami ly 
planning_ (Liebermnn, 1'-)93 , p. 37) 
• Scnate Finance Committee : Has jurisciiclion over health programs supported by tax 
revenues, including Medicare and Medicaid . (Li eberman, 1993, p_ 37) 
• Physic ian Payment Review Commission (PPRC): Suppo rt agency created by 
Congress in the mid-1980s. The Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) 
has "l:ome to playa crucial ro le in oversight of Federal health 
programs and in the design of cost measures for such programs" 
and Ornstein, 1995 , p. 7) "A rcgular sourl:e of technical 
committees withj urisdiclion over Med icare-- the Ways and Means Committee and 
the E nergy and Commerce Committee in t ile HOllse, lind the Finan(;e Committee 
in the Senate" (Mnnn lind Ornstein. 199'i, p. 106) 
• Democratic Party : Tends to supponmllndatory government-d irected proposals. 
(DeLew, et aI. , P)92, p. l ~ I) Differences exist wi thin the party . A portion of the 





public provi sion of !:Overage to their 
Other positions included Sllpport for 
and the Medicare or fe derally budged 
c. [NVmONMENTAL PROPF.RTIES 
The extent to which the Departmtnt orHe~lth and Human Services (DHHS) operates 
in an open system is implied by J\.-fann and Ornstein's statement that "health care reaches 
deeply into the economy and society, to uching evcly individual and enterprise" (Mann and 
Ornstein, 1995, p. 12), This statement suggests Owl the actions of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS), as the administrator ofgovemment health care programs, have 
the potential to afteCl not only sectors of society but the population at large. Consistent with 
the propenies of an open system, those "necled by Department ro1icics find decisions have 
Ihe ability to respo nd through their elected offit:iai;; 
The complexity oflhis re lationship is further increased by an environmental property 
described by Schick ( 1995) as "hyperplura iism"- Hypelviuralism is characteriLed by "the vast 
growth in the number of imelest groups and especially in the trade associations and 
'Washington Represent~tiws' seeking to intlllenee national policy" (Schick, 1995, p. 238) 
f his "fi"acturing" of the environment into ~ I<\rger number of special intereSlS places additional 
demands on the Department of Health and Huma n Selvices (OHHS) as it is confronted with 
the increasing number of environ1l1entallinkages that must be managed 
1. Hyperpillralism in the Mrllic:!l C01llll11111ity 
In a hyperpluralistie rnvim llllltlll , as the number of associations multiplies, "the 
capacity ofa parent group to represent speciali led interests, o r to speak fOf the entire .';ector 
diminishes" (Schick. 1995, p. 2]8). An example of hyperpimalis1l1 in health care reform 
includes the American College of Physicians' unvei ling of 16 criteria "that any overhaul of the 
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system should meet. while at the same time refusing to sign on with the American Society of 
Internal Medicine (AS 1M), which endorsed the American Medical Association'~ (AMA) 
Health Access America plan" (Conroy, 199 t, p. 38). In another instance, the Physicians for 
a National Health Plan referred to "American Medical Association talk about health care 
reform as simply that: rhetoric" (Abramowitz, 1991, p. Z I 0) 
Yet another example of this effect is illustrated in Representative Pete Stark's August 
1991 interview with Medical World News. Then chairman orthe House Ways and Means 
1 Ie.1!th Subcommittee, Stark described a process in which the committee dealt with .1 v.1riety 
of medical intnest groups rather than a single represent.1tivc of the rnedical community St.1rk 
described 
making de.11s with all those grollps-- surgeons. ophthalmologists, 
while the AMA hlls sort of been sitting 
(PoHner, 1991. 
p,26) 
2. Hyperptur.1lislII in Govenunellt 
A phenomenon similar in effect to that suggested by hyperpluralism may be observed 
within the Legislative branch, .I n Congress, jurisdiction over health care issues "is spread over 
numerous committees and subcommittees in the House and Senate" (Mann and Ornstein, 
1995, pp. [-2), Mann and Ornstein \(l suggest that legislat ive jurisdiction is more complex 
than the relationships involving the four committees identified in the environmentlll model as 
having jurisdiction over health care issues Altllough the House Energy and Commerce 
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Commitlee, House Commi1tee on Ways ~nd \ i eans, Semlle Labor and Human Resources 
Committee and Senate Finance Committee "hold the lion 's share of health jurisdiction the 
scope and underlying policy area [heillth carel virtually guarantees that almost eVe1)' 
committee will have a legitimate claim to some piece oflhe act ion" (Mann and Ornste im, 
1995, p_ 3). Consequently, hom the perspective of Health and Human Services (HHS), the 
lin kage between health care interest grollps and Congress is not a singular channel but a 
network of mult iple conduits leading to members of Co ngress and congressional committees 
3. HyperpluTlllislIl;1l Oiher lut el'rst Groups 
The Department of Health and Human Services (Ol-H-IS) must also consider ig 
linkages with citizen and consumer groups Fracturing with in these g rou ps is observable in 
a manner similar to that present in government and medical groups. This phenomenon is 
illustrated by considering the elderly Although the elderly arc largely the most immediately 
affected group wit h regard to physici('.n payment rcform. literature ex ists that suggests that 
they may also have ditlicu lty maintaining ~ lln ited position An explanation of their 
predicament is suggestcd hy Pauly in which he indicates that the "spli t of the elderly into 
'havcs' find 'have nots' will make it difficult to maintai n II united social insurance facad e" 
(Pauly, 1988. p_ 6S) 
Examples of similar behaviors for the remaining organizations in the Health and 
Human Services (HHS) environment are presented in government transcripts, professional 
journals and the popular literature_ Addit ional examples relevant to the development and 
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implementation of the Medicare Fee Schedule (~1FS) will be introduced as schedule 
components are discussed . 
D. ORGANTZATIOKALACTIVITY IN PAYMENT REFORM 
The Department of Health and I luman Services (DHHS) received its flr.~t instructions 
from Congress to begin the development ofa physician fee schedule based on a relative value 
scale in the fonn of mandates contained in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OUR.As) 
01'1985, 1986 and 1987. (Department of Heal th and Human Services, 1991, p. 15) For 
assistance in this undertaking, the Department employed a "number of experts inside nnd 
outside of government"(Department of Health and Human Services, 1991. p. 15) The 
l larvard University School of Public Health was contfllcted to do much of the Relative Value 
Scale (RVS) development. The Urban Instilli te (UI) and the Center for Health Economics 
Research (CHER) have been described by Health and Human Services (HHS) as being 
"instrumental in the devdopment of the Geographierd Practice Cost Indexes (GPeIs)'" 
(Department of Health and Humnn Services, 199 1, p. 15). In addition to these private sector 
organizations. Health and Human Services (HBS) has described the contributions of the 
Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) as "invaluable and extremely useful al 
every stage of the fee schedule development"' (Depaltment of Health and Human Services. 
1991, p. 30) 
Fonnal congressional controls were maintained during the early development of the 
fee schedules by requirements set forth in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) 
of 1985, 1986 and 1987 that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) submit 
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three reports no later than October of 1989 that summarized "the results of extensivt: research 
and analysis relating to the possible implementation of a Jvledicare physician fee schedult:" 
(Department of Health and J-Iuman Services. 1991, p. 15) These reports were entitled the 
"Volume and Intensity of Physician Service,", "Relative Value Scales for Physician Services", 
and "Implementation ora National Fee Schedule"(Depm1mem of Hcalth and Human Services, 
1991, p. 15) 
Approximately two months after receiving the October 1989 Health and Human 
Services (HHS) report, Congress provided specific instructions to the Department of Health 
and I-Iuman Services (DHHS) regarding the procedures and methods that would be used to 
implemcnt a relative value based physician fee sc hedu le by January I, 1992. Although the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1')89 provided some specific guidance, it has 
been described by Health and Human Selvices (HHS) as having "left a number of key 
payment policy am! technical issues to the Secretary of Health :llld I-iuman Services for 
resolution" (Department of He"lth and Hlllllan Services, 199 1, P 15) 
One of the specific congressional requ il-ements provided to Health and Human 
Services (HHS) in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1989 was that a model 
orthe fcc schedule be made available to the public by September I, 1990 "in order to provide 
an early opportunity for pubhc review of the ICc sched ule methodology" (Department of 
Health and Human Services. 19<) I, p_IS) The 1l1ode l W~~ pllhlisht:d by Health and Human 
Service~ (HHS) on September 4, 1990 and included a) a description of statutory 
requirements, b) identification of technical and policy issues for which the Secretary of the 
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Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had discretion, c) a summary of actions 
that had already been taken regarding fee schedule development, and d) a summary 9f planned 
actions for resolving issues that required resolution prior to program implementation_ It 
should be noted th(lt in their discussion of program options. Health and Human Services 
(HHS) identified " prefer red options . in some cases" while " in other case~ options were 
discussed without identification ofa preferred approach' (Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1991, p. 16) 
On June S. 1991 . the Depanment of Health and Human Services (DIIHS) published 
in the Federal Register their proposed nile for estahlishing a physici(ln fee schedule by January 
1, 1992, Upon its release, Louis W SlllIivan, M,D,. then SecretfllY of the Depanment of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS). described the paymcnt sy~tern as intended 10 "help 
address longstanding imbalances between Medicare payments to urban and nlTal physicians 
and between primary care physici(lns and certain specialties, slich as surgeons" (Fisher, 199 1, 
p. 3) However. not all organizations in the Health and Hliman Services (HHS) environment 
shared Dr. Sullivan's prognosis for the pl'Oposed rille 
On July 31, 1991 the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC), "sharply 
criticized details of the nationwide fee schedule that the Rush Administration planned to put 
into efreet" in January 1992 (Pear, 19')1, p 17) In thei r statement, the Commission 
described the proposed implementation as posing "serious risks to beneficiaries' access to 
care" and threatening "the integrity of the physician payment reform approved by Congress 
in 1989" (Pear, 199 1, p_ 17). The American Acade:ny of Family Physicians (AA1-1-'), 
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characterized by Poilner as "the physician specialty most favored by the new Medicare fees 
schedule," described the Department of Health and lIuman Serviccs (DHHS) action as a 
"hctrayal" (Pol1ner, 1991, p, 60) 
During the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) hearings that followed 
release of the proposed plan, the Amcrican Medical Association (M-1A), American Society 
of Internal Medicine (ASIM), the American Collc,Q,e of Surgeons (ACS), the American 
Academy of Family Physiciall5 (.MF!') and other medical groups Joined in warning the 
Commission that "physicians' cnntidence in and cooperation with payment reform and the 
Medicare program are in seriollsjeooarcty" (lJER No_ 113, 1991, p_ A-4)_ The American 
Medical Associatio;~ (AMA) added tilat, "contrary to Congress' intent and its commitment 
to physicians," the Health and i-Iuman S('rvices (HHS) proposed rille transformed 'payment 
reform into a budgd cutting tool" (DER 'r\o, 113, If)')l, p, A4) 
Upon conclusion of th e Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) hearing~ a 
report vvd.,'; made to Congress sUlllmarizinp, the findings of the Commission pertaining to fee 
so:.:hl:dule irnpkmentatioll, The report included bnguage imJicating that thl: Commission 
"found significant prohlems thaC if not corrected, might jeopardize the success of payment 
reform perhaps the most critical" being the conversion facl(lr (Lee, et aI, 1991, p. 1562) 
Also cited hy the Commission were ·'significant dislOrlion~" remaining in the Relative Value 
Scale (R VS) (Lee, et al., 10')], fl, 1562}, II: the end "pilysicial1 groups all agreed with the 
American IVledical Association's (AMA) conGiusion that the number 1 priority in its battle 
plan should be to restore the convcrsiOll t?ctOI- to its intended level," which was the level 
II'; 
consistent with medical group interpret~tions of the congressional requi rement for budget 
neutrality (Mcllrath, 199 1, p_ I) 
Reactions on the part of the Dep~r1ment of Health ~nd Human Ser·,:ices (DHHS) 
organizational envirorunen! to the perceived intent of the proposed rule mark a change in the 
degree of hyper pluralism in this environmcnt As observed by Physician Payment Review 
Commission (PPRC) member J Eisenberg, the Health and Human Services' (I-DIS) proposed 
implementat ion of physician payment reform had the efrect of achievi ng "lateral consensus 
here among providers and beneflci ~ri es for the first time in the fivc years we've been 
addressing this (payment reform) it's reatly qu ite heartwarm ing' (l'ollner, 1991, p. 60) 
The Conversion Fllctor (eF) 
The proposed rule for a physician fee schedule incorporated a Conversion Factor 
value of$26.87 to be used in the implementation of the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS)_ The 
Health Care Financing Administr~tion (HCF A) acknowledged "that amount had been reduced 
by 16 perccnt in order to ma.intain bmlgct neutrality" (Medicine & Health, 1992. [no page no 
provided]) The Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) reduction was based upon an 
a,sumption that in order to maintain budget neutrality under the new fee schedule they would 
have to allow for changes in provider and bendiciary behavior as well as the effects of the 
transition schedule described in Ch~pter n . The physician behavior which the Administration 
was ant icipating was an increase in the volume of services provided in order to compensate 
for lost income. Of the proposed reduetiol1 . (, percent was attriuuted to the effects of the 
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transition schedule while 10 percent was allowed for the behavioral offset. (Medicine and 
Health, 1992, [no page no. provided]) 
One of the objections to the assumption's 16 percent discou nt in the Conversion 
Faclor (CF) was the implication that physicians would respond to the policy by increasing 
volume to regain lost income (Medicine & Health, 1992, [no page no . provided]) Physicians 
appeared to object not only to the level of the offset but also to its implication that " they 
pract iced medicine for monetary pu rposes rather than for the patient' s best interest" 
(Medicine & Health, j()()2, page llulllbcl- not provided) 
Another objection to the Conversion Factor was the acknowledgment by the 
Admin istrat ion that the fce schcthilc "woli id s~ve the Government a total ofatlcast $6.9 
billion. .from 1992 to 1996" (Penr. 1991. p. 17) This ncknowledgment led to disputes 
between the Health Care Finnncing Administrat ion (HeF A) and interest groups over the 
propriety orthe agency's interpretations of the budget neu tmlity requirements put forth in the 
Omnibus Budget ReconciliMion Act (OBRA) of 1989. The Physician Payment Review 
Commission's (PPRC) charged that " it is not cl·edible thm Congress intended substantial 
budget savings" in its requirement for budget neutrality. (Pear. 199 1. p. 17) 
Differences between the Health Ca re Financing Administration (i'ICl'A) and inte rest 
groups over the appropriate Conversion Factor (CF) vallie were resolved by compromise 
In the publication of the final n.li e governing fcc schedule hllplementation, "the conversion 
factor was sct at $30.42. 13.2 percent higher than \lnder the proposed rule" (Medicine and 
Health, 1992, [no page no . provided]) In addi!ion to the 13 .2 percent concession, inflation 
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was applied to the $30.42 figure, raising it to $] 1.00 in 1992 (Medicine and Health, 1992, [no 
page no. provided]) 
A number of interest groups ind icated satisfhc(ion with the compromisc The 
American Medical Association's (AMA) executive vice president, James S. Todd, suggested 
that "physicians generally are pleased wit h HCFA 's accommodations" (Medicine and Health, 
1992, [no page no. provided]), The American Medical Association (AMA) responded to the 
Administration's compromise by electing not to continue to "push to get lhe behavioral offset 
legislatively changed" (Medicine and Hcalth, 1992, [no page no. provided]). In accepting the 
behavioral adjustment, the American Medical Association's (AMA) Todd acknowledged that 
volume of services provided was going to increase, bIll he att ributed the increase to "reasons 
that are not related to physician behavio l. but tied 10 facto rs such as the emergence of 
new technolob'Y and the aging of the us. population" (Medici ne and Health, 1992, [no page 
no. provided]) 
2. Relative Value SC:Ile 
The American Medical Association (AMA) also took issue with Health Care 
Financing Administration (liCFA) testimony before Congress "that the Relative Value System 
(R VS) had been made as accurate as possible" (Lee, et aI, 1991, p. 1562) . Differences in the 
intentions communicated in the Notice of Propos cd Rule Making (NPRM) in 1991 regarding 
the redistribution of payments and those expected by physicians appear to have been the 
source of much of the disappointment in th~ medical profession 
l IS 
Specifkally, phy~icinns had anticipated [hat thc Relative Value Scale (RVS) would 
"incrc:ase payments lor jllifll1lry care by about 30 percent and reduce payments for surgery 
and other procedures by about 16 percent overall" (Mcllrath, 1991, p. I). Instead, the 
info rmation published in the June 5, 199 1 proposed ru le indicllIed that the Heal th Care 
Financing Administration (HeFA) predicted that 
In addition to medical interests such as the American Society of Anesthesiologists 
(ASA) and the American Academy of Ophtha lmology (AAO) voicing objections to the 
ma gnitude of the proposed redlLcti()ll~ for their communities, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) and other physician's groups argued that the reduction in payments to 
internists as a re~ult orlhe proposed sca le "undermined one orthe key objectives of payment 
refortn" (Mcllrath, 1991, P I) These Assoc;ations argued that by not furnishing incentives 
for increas ing the number ofparticip(lting intem is(s there would be a decrease in the number 
of primary care providers. Regarding (he eflect ort he propo~ed Relative Value Scale (R VS) 
on providers, physicians indicated (hat 
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The American Medical Association (AMA) and othcr physician groups also indicated 
that the Relative Value Scale (RVS) as puhlished in the proposed rule (Department of Health 
and Human Services, 1991 , p. 1- 179) would reduce payillents "in all states-- even those with 
many underserved rural areas" (McIlrath, 199 1, p. I) The American Academy of Family 
Physicians (AAFP) acknowledged "some payment gains" but indicated that the magnitude of 
the increases were "unlikely to draw more medical studcnts to filmily practice ,llld rural areas" 
(McIlrath, 1991, p. I ) 
Another objection raised by special intcrcst groups to the proposed Relative Value 
Scale (RVS) inchlded in the filial nile concerned the data used in determining it. Speaking 
on behalfofthe American Society of Tnternal Me<1icine (ASTM), Trustee J.L Lichtenfeld, l'v1D 
"urged the Physician Payment Review CnmmissiorJ to recommend that Health and Human 
Services (HHS) replace all exist ing pract ice cost I-dative villue units with new ones based on 
the resource costs of providing each service, rilther than historical charges" (Culhane, 1992, 
p.9) 
Conftdence in the proposed Relative Value Scale (RVS) was also atT'ected by the 
behavior o f the Health Care finilncing Administrntion (HCFA) prior to its implementation 
Specifically. the Health Care Financing Admill imation (HerA) suggested in congressional 
testimony that the proposed scale was not ready to bc implemented ilnd that "thcy preferred 
a 1993 RBRVS [Resource Based Relative Value Scale] arrival date" (Mcl1rath, 1991, p. I) 
Their request for an extension was not granted. Having been ignored by Congress . the 
Administrat ion espoused the position 1 hilt they wou ld "II)' to be as responsive as we can 10 
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problems that arise but we hope Ihllt piJysicillns will give us a lot of help and 
understand ing" (Mdlrllth, 199 1, p. I) 
As a resu lt of ~peeilll interest grollp objeetiol1~ lind the Administration's etTorts to 
revise to the Relative Value Scale (R VS) within two months of program implementation, the 
Relative Value Scale (RVS) "published in the filial rule was considered interim" and subject 
to change in 1993 (Mcllfilth, 1991, p. I) Resolution of differences between the American 
MC(iical Association (AMA) and other physician groups over the Relative Value Scale (R VS) 
was still pending in 1992. A notable response of the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) to physician concems has been 10 decrea~e the review and upd ate periodicity for the 
Relative Value Scale (RVS) ITom the legislative requirement of at least once every fiv e years 
to every year 
3, Gcogn\phic Pnlcticr Cost Indcx{'s 
As discussed in Chaptel- II, Ii Ie Geographic Practice Cost Indcxcs were an importan t 
part of the proposed rule issued by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCfA) 
Although the Indexes were intended to CO:'I-ect for imbalances between rural and urban 
physician payment rates, the iitemture illdicates that the values pre~ented in the proposed rule 
were not favorably received by physician grours such ,1S thc America n Medical Association 
(AMA) 
fhe specillc goal of the Ame~ i clln Medical Association (A'vlA) regarding the 
proposed Geographic Practice Cost Indexes (GPCls) WIIS to "correct flawed proxy data used 
to calculate" index values (DER No. 12 , 1992, p. S-19) As indicated in the December 9, 
1991 American Medical News, "vi1tuall y everyone complained that much of the data used to 
construct the indexes was outdated" (Mcllmt k 199 1, p. I). In response, the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) '·promised to redo the indexes when da ta fro m the 1993 
census and a survey of professional liability costs are availahle" (Mcilrath, 1991, p. I) 
This chapter has considered the organ izational environmcnt for the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) during the development lind implementation of physician 
payment refonn fi'om a macro perspective . Chapter V models and employs the perspectives 
offered by insti tutional and resource dcpendency (heory if1 order 10 develop a greater 
understanding of the events that transpi red during reform implementat ion 
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figure 27. Bryson's Stakeholder Map for II Government 
!23 
Figure 28. The Organizational Envii"Onment ot the Departm 
Services (DI-IHS) 
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V. PERSPECTIVE S ON REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This (;haptcr considers the development and impicmentation of physician payment 
reform described in Chapters I, IT. and IV from an institutional and resource dependency 
perspective_ Specifically, using the Deparlment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as the 
focal organization_ the theories described in Cbapter III, are used to inform the discussion of 
the events that transpired dur ing the implemcntation of the Medicare Fee S(,;hedule (NfFS) . 
n. AI'l'ROXfJ\-tATING ACTIVITY IN HIE ENV1H.ONMENT 
In this portion of the analysis the mode l of the Department of Health and I-Iuman 
Serviccs (DHRS) organizational environment was defined as the activity of the special 
interest groups involved in physician payment rdorm Specifically. activity was approximated 
by thc frcq uency of references to an organization in a sample of the health care rdated 
literature . The health cal'e related literature comprising the sample consisted of a tolal of 
1750 pages from 147 articles obtained from the LEXIS'" INEXIS": data base. Examples of 
the sources from which the articlcs were drawn include goverllillent publications (e.g. Health 
Care Financing Review), medical publications (e_g_ The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, New England Journal of Medicine, tvlodern Health Care, Medicine and Health), 
\.>llsiness publications (Business & Health, Hllsiness tnsurance, Hureatl of National Affairs 
Pension & llenefits Reporter) ilnd the popular press (e.g_ Wall Street Journal, New York 
Times, Los Angles Times. Tile BoslOn Globe, etc_). Articles were restricted to the period 
l2S 
1984-1994 and to subjects addressing health care refoml, Medicarc Part fl, physician payment 
reform, and the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS) 
The sample articics were eXlImined for references to the 66 organizations belonging 
to the interest groups modeled in figure 28. Quotations attributed to an organization in the 
articles or references to positions held by an organization were counted and recorded in the 
"frequency" column in the Appendix, The activity level for an interest group was then 
calculated by dividing the organization's frequency of occurrence by the total frequency for 
all organizat ions and recorded in the ·'activity level" column of the Appendix 
\Vith three exceptions, to the 66 organiZiltions screened in the sample, only those with 
an al.1ivity level greater than 5 percent were selected for inclusion in the analysis The three 
exccptions include the Senate Finllnce Committee (1.64 percent), the Senate Labor and 
Human Resources Committee (0.48 percent), an(1 the HO\l~e Energy and Commerce 
Committee (0.34 percent). These organizations were included to provide a relative indication 
of the activity of key decision makers in the House Committee on Ways and Means and those 
on the other three major health care committees within the Legislative branch 
A model of the Department of j lealth and Human Services (OHHS) organizational 
environment is presented in figure 29, In addition to the Department of Health and Human 
Services' (DHHS) environmental linkages, Figure 29 also identifies pathways described in the 
health care related literature that were used by special interest groups as they sought to 
influence the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) implementlHion of the 
requirements of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OURAs) of 1989 and 1')')0 
C. I:"l"STlTUTlO:"l"AL PERSPECTIVE 
In this section the manner in which thc lkpartmell\ of Health and I-hunan Sel\lices 
COHRS) implemented the :\1ediCilre Fee Schedule CvfFS) is considered from an institutional 
perspective. This portion of the analysis places emphasis on: a) the organizational structure 
adopted the Department ofHeallh and Hllman Services (DHHS) to t~'lcilitatc implementation 
of the reform requireml;;[1ts, b) thl;; manner in which resource generation wa$ addressed in 
Department of Health and Hllman Services (DHHS) actions, and c) indications and measures 
of organizational performance for the Department oCHealth and Human Services (DHHS) 
1. Organizational Structure 
Since the inception of the \1e<iicare Program Olle of the more prominent changes ill 
the Department oCHealth and Human Serv'ices' (DHHS) organi7,ational structure was the 
fonnation of the Health Ci\re Financing Administration (HCFA) Institutional theory suggests 
that the creation of the Health Care Financing Administration (HeFA) allowed the 
Departml;;nt oCHealth anti Human Serv'ices (DHHS) to integrate with the environrnellt and 
create the image ofmecting the increasin~ demand., being mac.e by the complex environment 
t hat was described in Chapter I 
Institutional theOlY also sug,!!,ests that thc Dcpartment of Health and Human Services 
CDlITIS) would use the organizational .,tr:lctllre to bllffer the technical core uf the 
organization_ As the primary point ofcCllltact fen issues I-elated to physician payment reform, 
the Hea!th Care financing Administratiun (llCFA) provided a means to huffer core activities 
of the Department of Health and Human Service~ (])HHS) from the uncertainties of lile 
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implementation of the Medicare Fee Schedule (MfS). The effectiveness of this buffer is 
evid ent from the quantity of direct exchanges between the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) and Congress. the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) 
and special interest groups that are described in the health care related literature 
Similarly. by employing the setvices oforganizl'Ilions such as the Urban Inst itute (Ui). 
the Center for Health Economics Research (CHER). and the Harvard School of Puhlic 
Health. the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A) was abo ablc to provide huffering 
between the Depanrnent and its environment. Had the Administration elected to develop the 
proposed ru le through the exclusive lise of illlernal resources. proof of the validity of the 
methodology employed would have rested entirciy with the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA). Instead. the Health Cnre Financing Administration (HCFA) 
decoupled itsel f frolll a portion of the development of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
(NPRM) in effect. shielding itscifand the Dep~rtment of Hell ith and Human Services (DHHS) 
by purclmsing expenise and legit imacy from the orgilnizations with which it contracted 
Z. Resource Geueration 
Institut ional theory suggests that the Depilt1ment of Health and Human Services 
(DI-ll-iS) would construct thc Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) so that the proposeu 
rule conformeu with the expectations of the organizations in the environment. By conforming 
with environmental expectations, the Department of Health and Human Selvices (DHHS) 
woulu be acting in a manner that would allow the proposed r\l le to be perceived as legitimate 
by both Congress and other environmental organi":<ltions. Fut1hermore. by conforming with 
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the norms and expectatiuns of reform, the DepUI1ment of Health and Human Services 
(DImS) would be acting to protect t he scarce resources needed for survival. Specifically, 
conformance with norms and expectations would mitigate the risk of disturbing the flow of 
funding to lhe Department of Health and Hu man Services (DJ-rnS) from the Congress. 
The initial behavior of the Depar:ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) during 
Ihe implementation ofrefonn however was not consistent with that suggested by inst itutional 
theory. The health care related li teratu re indicates that prior to t he publishing of the NOl.icc 
of Proposed Ru le Making (NPRM) shart:d beliefs regard ing the intent of physician payment 
refonn existed among the organizations in the environment Althuugh not a comprehensive 
list, the previous chapters and tne health C~ le re lated literatu re indicate the American Medical 
Association (AMA), Physician Paymelll Review Commission (PPRC), Congress and the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HeFA) ag reed that 
p. xii) 
• Reform would be implemented in a manner t hat was budget neutral. (Department 
o f Health and Iluman Services, 1991. pp. 1-171) 
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Contrary to the hehavior suggested by institutional thl:ory. the Depal1ment of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS) developed a proposed rule that wa~ perceived by the 
environment a~ corruTIunicating an intent to implement a policy that was inconsistent with the 
aforementioned environmental norms and expec.tations, These pre-rule norms and 
expectations arc user! in this analysis to illustrate how the Health Care I'inancing 
Administration (IICFA) lost legitimacy with its environment as a result of the proposed rule 
As discussed in Chapter IV. the proposed rule was not perceived hy thc environment 
as correcting inequities in payment amollg prilll~l-y care amlteclinical procedures. Instead, 
the proposed rule indi(;ated tliat only family illld genentl physicians would experience 
increases Consequently, a degree or legitimacy was lost w~th internists and other primary 
care providers who believed (;ongrl:ssional promiSI:S and thl: sliltelTIenb by thl: SI:(;fl:tary of 
the Depmtment of Health and Human Selvices (OHHS) that payment reform would correc.t 
longstanding imhalances hetween primary care providers and specialists. 
Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter IV, the pi'ospeetive increase in general 
practitioner and tamily p!lysician late~ was viewed by tl,e medi(;al wmlTIunity as not providing 
an adequate incentive to attl-act new medical stlldents to the prirnary care sector, another 
ohjective of reform Also, as discllssed in the previolls chapter, in addition to the 
unanticipated rate reductions enCOlintered by i~lternists and many other primary care 
providers, speciali~ts whu had anticipated a declille in rates saw the magnitude of the 
proposcd decline increase ill some cases by a3 IlllLch ii, 100 PCICCi1L By departing from the 
expectations ofbuth those who stood to lose ns we,] as those who stood to gain from reform, 
th e Department of Health ami Human Services (DHHS) created an outcome with no clear 
winners. As a result. the Department of Health and Human Sen.:iccs (DHHS) lost a measure 
of legitimacy and the degree of hyper pluralism in the environment decreased 
Another objective of the Medicare ree Schedule (~1FS) that the organizations irl the 
environment perceived as being violated by the Not ice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) 
was the failure of the proposed Geographic Adjustment Factors (OAfs) to raise payment 
rates in rural areas relative to those in urhan areas. In Chapter IT it was explained that the 
Geographic Adjustment Factors (GAl's) were intended in part to correct imbalances between 
rural and urban payment rates and thus encourage the migratio n of practitioners to the 
underserved rural areas. By not raising rural area payment rates. the proposed rule failed to 
provide the incentive required to encoll l'age physicians to estab li sh practices in nu-al, 
underserved regions. To the contrary, as discussed in the previous chapter, even physician 
payment rates in underserved rural areas were perceived by physician groups as declining 
under the proposed rule. 
\Vith regard to the deviations frolll the nOrlllS and expectations of physician payment 
refonn as discussed in Chapter IV. one oflhe :nore prominent conc~rns for physician groups 
was the Health Care Financing Admillist l-ation's (HCFA) interpretation of the requirements 
for budget neutrality_ Two or tile objections ra ised by the orga nizations in the environment 
addressed the underlying assumptior:s made by the Health Care Fi nancing Administration 
(HCFA) regarding the need to apply onsets to tile COllversion Factor (CF). As discussed in 
the previous chapter. the Conversion F~clor (CF) adjustillents th<lt the Health Care Fin<lncing 
1]1 
Administration (HCF A) maintained were necessary to achieve budget neutrality were tht;: 
belmvioral and transitional offset.<; 
In addition to violating payment rt;:form norms and objectives regarding budget 
nt;:utrality, the Health Cart;: Financing Administration's (HCFA) treatment of the hehavioral 
offset was also viewed by ponions of the organizationHI environment as challenging tht.: hditf 
that physieiHlls put pHtient care betore monetary rewa rd. Oy proposing a policy that was 
perceived hy the environmt.:nt as qut;:stioning the legitimacy of the medical profession, the 
Ht.:alth Care Financing Administration (HCFA) provided organizations with a symbol u~ed 
by leaders in the environment to gt.:nerHte unification in opposition to the proposed rule 
Physicia n groups and the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) also 
questioned the legitimacy of the behHvioml ol1:set by charHcterizing its effect as transforming 
the Medicare Fee Schedule (lv1FS) into a budget ctl!ling tool. This characterization placed 
the behavioral Offsd in a context that was contrary to the expectations of organizations in the 
environment of a budget neutral fee schedule implementation. Again the behavior of the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HerA) was inC0n~istent with the move toward 
conformity with the environment as sll~e,ted by institutional theOlY Thi.~ nonconformity 
is demonstrated in tht.: mainknar](,:c of the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) 
interpretation of the need for the behavioral offsets despite the acknowledgment that the 
behavioral off.~d would result in a savings of~pproximatdy $6_9 bi ll ion over the fee schedule 
transition and the Physician Payment Review Commi%ion (PPRC) announcement that the 
projected savings were incomistent with congressional intent 
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Simultaneously, the Health Care Financing Adrnini~tril1ion' s (HCFA) suggestion that 
budget neutr<tlity did not apply to the entire tmnsi /ion period btlt only to the fi rst year led \0 
disputes with the organizational t:IlVirOllll1Cnt over the transit ional offsd, Objections to the 
transitional offset were simi lar to those rai sed by orga l!izations in the environment over t he 
behavioral offset. An illustration of the manner in whi ch the legitimacy of the offset was 
questio ned includes the American Medical Association (AMA) obtaining an independent legal 
interpretation oflhe requirements of the reform stat ute that contradicted the interpretat ion 
maintained by the Health Care Financi ng Administra tion (HCFA) 
Similar ly, the legitimacy of both the transi tional lind behavioral offsets was also 
challenged in Physicilln Pllyment Review Commission (PPRC) hear ings that resulted in the 
Commission's reject ion of the Health Cale Financ ing Administ ra ti on (HCrA) interpretations 
upon which the offsets were ullsed Despite the resistance of the org~ nizational environment, 
t he Health Care Financing Admi nistration (HCrA) remained committed to Ihe need for the 
offsets 
The final illustration of the perception th~t the proposed rule deviated frolll the 
congressional intent for payment reform is found ill the speculation of organizations in the 
environment regarding the impaci of the rule 0 11 access to healt h care services. Unlike t he 
previous three examples, the perceived th reat to access is not readily observahle by examining 
object ions to single components of the proposed wle Instead, the health care re lated 
literature suggests that organi7-"1tions in the environment viewed the Notice of Proposed Rule 
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Making (NPR..\.1) from il. macro perspectiw when indicating concern for a reduction in access 
for Medicare beneficiaries 
A~ discussed in Chapter IV hoth the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) 
and the American Medical Association (A\AA) expn:ssed concemoo for the impact the Notice 
of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) incentives would have on access. Evidcnce of the loss 
of legitimacy and the degree to which the proposed rule departed from environmental 
expectations is evident in the characteriLation of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making 
(NPRM) by physician groups as a "betrayal" The health C,lre rdated literalun: describes 
leaders of physician organizations as responding to the proposed rule hy suggesting that, as 
a result ofthc incentives provided by the proposed implementation, fewer physicians would 
be willing to see Part B beneficiaries in the future 
In addition to the legitimacy lost with special interest gmups, as described ahove and 
in the previous chapter, the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC) also considered 
the proposed nlle as placing access to care and the intent of reform at risk. All of the 
organi72tions presented in Figure 29, formally indicated disagreement with the Health Care 
financing Administration's (HCFA) interpretation of the reCjllirements of reform and 
expressed concern for the effect that the proposed rule was likely' to have on beneficiary 
The health care related literatllre indicates that the Health Care Financing 
Administraiion (HCFA) did not demonstrate a willingness to conform with envirol1TIJental 
expectations until the special interest gmups and the Physician Payment Review Commission 
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(PPRC) succeeded in convincing members of Congress that the proposed rule was 
inconsistent with the intent of reform Up until this point. the Health Care Financing 
Administration's (HCFA) argument tor not compromising had been based on the Health Care 
Financing Administration's (HCFi\) belief that the proposed rule represented the best 
interpretation of the requirements of reform_ Convinced that the Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making (NPRM) most closely approximated the congressional mandate, the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) appears to have been willing to tolerate the loss of 
legitimacy with the environment 
However, a prominent development that contributed to the Health Care Financing 
Administration's (HCFA) move toward conformity was proposed legislation that threatened 
congressional direction that contmdicted the Health Care Financing Administration's (I-ICFA) 
interpretation of the requirements of reform For example bi ll s were introduced in the House 
of Representatives and the Scnilte that proposed the redllction or elimination of the behavioral 
and transitional offsets 
Institutionill theory sllggests that the one eXlllanillion for the change in the Health Care 
Financing Administration's (HCFA) position was the loss the proposed rule's legitimacy with 
the Congress_ The Health Care ~·inalJ(.:ing Administration (HCFA) relied upon Congress for 
funding, the scarce resource that it needed to survive By continuing to support an 
inlcrpretation of payment reform that was viewed as illegitimate by those who both draned 
it and controlled Health Care Financing Administration (IICfA) nmding, the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) h~d placed Iht! organizat ion's survival at risk 
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On August 27, 1991, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) announced 
that it planned to ahandon the transitional offset proposal. acknowledging that "it was a 
mistake all in all" (BNA, 199 1. p, I), The health care related literature indicates that the 
congressional interpretation of the abandonment of the tmnsitional offsct was vicwed as the 
Health Care Financing Administmtion (HCFA) "sending a message to Congress that 
lcgislativc action [was] not necessary" (UNA, 199 1, p, I), This action symbolizcd for 
Congress the intention of the Health Care Fimmcing Administration (HCFA) to comply with 
congressional expectations for fee schedule implementation 
Confomlity with environmental expectations regarding the behavioral offset was not 
as complete as in the casc of the transitional offset, Althougll the threatened legislative 
direction to reduce or eliminate the behavioral offset was never successfully passed, in 
November 199 1 the Health Care Financing Administration (HeF A) redesignatcd the offset 
as a "baseline adjustment" and reduced its value to 6_5 percent 
From an institutional perspective renaming and reducing the behavioral offset was a 
significant action, By redesignating the reduction as a baseline adjustment, the Health Care 
Financing Administration (I-ICFA) was able to reduce the Conversion Factor (CF) without 
having to continue to contront the belief that physicians put the patient before profits 
FUl1hermore, presenting the behavioral adjl\stment in this form afforded IIIC American 
Medical Association (AMA) the opportunity to compromise and accept a lesser reduction by 
acknowledging a prohable increase in patient and treatment volume due to "technology and 
an aging population" instead of physician behavior (Medicine and Health, 1992) . Through 
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compromise over Conversion Factor (CF) related interpretations, the Health Care Financing 
Activity (HCFA) was ahle to diffuse many of the concerns regarding the proposed rule and 
its impact on budget neutral ity 
Other concerns of the environment tilat were diHused through symbolic acts that 
demonstrated a willingness to compromise include a promise by the Health Care Financing 
Administration (l-ICfA) to continue to work to refine the proposed Rtlative Value Scale 
(RVS). Specifically, the Health Cart financing Administration (HCFA): a) promised to 
increase the fre!luency of review and revision of the scaie from the legislativtiy mandated 
peri od of once every live years to once every year, b) declared the Relativt Value Scale 
(R VS) published in the final nile as inttrim and subject to change in 1993, and c) extended 
the commentary period on the Relative Value Scalt (RVS) unti l March 1992. (McIlrath, 
1991, p. I) Through this commitment, the Heal th Cal-e Financing Administration (HCFA) 
demonstrated an intention to address one of the pre-rule expectations that the originally 
proposed Relative Value Scale (R VS) was perceiwd as violating. the increase in payment 
rates for primal)' care visits relative to those i()r tcchnieal procedu res 
Reso lution of concerns by medic?l special interest groups for the effect that the 
proposed rule was expected to have on the Geographic Adjustment Factors (GAPs) was 
handled by the Health Care Financi ng Administration (HCFA) in a similar fashion As 
discussed in Chapter IV and in the htlllt t, clire related literature, rel iance on "outdated' lind 
proxy data used in the formulation of the Geographic Adjustment Factors (GAFs) was one 
of the more prominent concerns over adJlIstment factol legitimacy_ AlthOl;gh Ihe Geographic 
Adjustment Factors (GAFs) were not adjusted in the tinal nile, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCfA) promised to "redo the indexes when data from the 1992 census and 
a survey of professional liab ili ty costs lwere] available" (Mcilrath. 1991, p 1) 
3. Organizational Pedol"lnance 
As described in Chapter IV, organizations of physicians and the American Medical 
Association (AMA) indicated satisfaction with the Health Care Financing Administration 's 
(HCFA) compromi~e, Through conformity with environmental nonns and expectations the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) was able to publisb a fi nal rule in November 
1991 that was received as legit imate by the majority of organizations in the environment 
Although medical special interest groups such as the American Medical Association 
(AMA) indicated that payment reform as implemented on hnuary 1992 did not represent an 
end state for reform and that Illany details stil l needed to be revised, organizations of 
physicians indicated general acceptance of the tin;!l rule. Evidence of the success of the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) t"egaining legitimacy for payment reform and 
implementing it on schedule may be found in the American Medical Association 's (M1A) 
statement of general Sfltisfaction with the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) 
accommodations described in the previolls chaptet· 
D. RESOURCE DEI'ENDE::NCY rERSI'f.CTIYE 
In this section resource dependency theory is used to examine the manner in which 
the Department of Health and Human services imp lemented the Medicare Fee Schedule 
(MFS). As with the institutional pOl1ion of the analysis, this examination places emphasis on 
a) the organizational structurc adopted to facil itate implementation of the reform 
requirements, b) the manner in which resource generat ion retlu irelnents were addressed in 
Depanment of Health and Hllman Services (DHHS) actions, and c) indications and measures 
of organizational performance 
OI'gani1.rlliolllll Structllre 
R esource dependency theory arglles that the Stluctllres and activities of a focal 
organization are a function of its adflptive response to environmental (;hanges as it seeks to 
survive This context provides insight ir.to the creation of the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) by the Dep<1l"lment of Health and J-Iuman Services (DHHS) 
Specifically, one argument for the cl'efltion of the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) was the awareness of the Depanmellt of Health and Human Services (DHHS) of the 
growing complexity and incrl:asing costs asso(;iated with the provision of.\1edicare benefits 
By creating the Health Care Financing Administrflt ion (HcrA), the Depanmem of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) was ada pting In a manner that would increase its potential for 
survival by dedicating resources to a segment o t'the environment that, liS discussed in Chapter 
1, demonstrated the potential to remain dynalJlic for the foreseeab le future 
Furthermore, by structuring itsel fi~l an effective manner through the (;reation of the 
Health Care Finllncing Administration (HCFA), the Departmcnt of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) was increasing its ability to CI"eMe tile f\cceptab le outcomes and actions 
req uired for survival. S[lccilicnlly, the Depnl-tment of Health and Human Service,, ' 
dependence on congressional reSOU r(;eS lequil"ed tha t it remain re~pollsive to the needs of 
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Congress. Resource dependency suggests that by creating the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was 
structuring itself in a manner that would allow it to remain responsive to its clients in 
Congress as the complexity of health care reform increased 
2. Resource Generation 
Using a resource dependency perspective one would arg\Je that an organization would 
be more likely to respond to the demand~ of tile organizations from which it obtains the 
critical resources required for survival than to demands from others present in the 
envirorunent. For the Depanment of Health and Human Services (DI·II-:lS). critical resources. 
in the form offunding. are obtained 6'om the Congress This prediction is consistent with the 
actions of the Health Cllre Financing Administration (IICFA) in the construction of the 
proposed rule 
A common theme throughout the debate over the contents of the proposed rule was 
the position adopted by the Health Care Financing, Administration (HCFA) that it was 
operating under the most correct interprelalion of the congressional physician payment reform 
mandates. One expl:mation for the unresponsiveness of the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) to alternative interpretat ions that were presented by organizations 
in the environment is ofl'ered by resource dependency theory. Specifically, the early behavior 
of the Health Care Financing Administril tio n (HCFA) i[1 responding only to legislative 
direction implies that in its enacteo environment, power over reform was perceived as resting 
exclusively with the Congress. This behavior is consistent with the rationality of resou rce 
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dtpendency in that by satisfYing Congress, the Health Care Fin(lIlCing Administration (HeFA) 
was positively influencing (he inflow of fllture fimciing . However, the organizat ional 
dynamics associated with the debate over the contents of the Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making (1\rpRM) suggest lha! the Health Care Financing Admini~tration's (HCFA) enacted 
environment did not include the llbili ty of other organizations in the environment to 
successfully influence Congress 
In particular, by not effectively managing the demands made th rough the other 
environmental1inbges depicted in Figllres 28 ami 29, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) encouraged the special interest groups to ad<lpt The health care related 
literature indic~tes th~t the adaptlltion of org~niz~ tions of physicians took the form of 
identitying alternative means for influencing the development of physician payment reform 
policy. The emergent strategy of the orgilniziltions in the environment suggests iln aWilreness 
of the value pla<:ed on the congressional linkage by the Depilftment of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS). Fur1hermore, as discussed in Chapter lV, organizations present in 
environment also appeared 10 recognize the influence of the Physicj~n Payment Review 
Commission (PPRC) on congressional p~ymenl reform policy_ As a result of the active 
lobbying of organizations such as the Americllil Medical Association (At\1A) with Congress 
and the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPKC). special interest groups were able 
10 gain the support of the major it y of Congress incillding such infllll':ntial members as 
Representative Stark. Subcommittee Chairmall of the WilYS and Means Subcommittee on 
Health and Senator Majority Leader Mitchell 
141 
Resource dependency theory suggests that had this cont ingency been allowed ror by 
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCF A), it would haw adapted in a manner that 
would have allowed it to protect its linkage with Congress. The Health Care Financing 
Administ ration (l-ICFA) might have adapted by reevaluating its relationship with organi7.ations 
such as the American Medical Association (AMA) and resolving differences in the 
interpretations over the requirements of the reform 
The health care related literature indicates that the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) remai ned unresponsive to the concerns of organizations in the 
environment until the threat of legislative act ion directing changes to the proposed rule 
emerged in Congress_ The actions orthe Health Cal'e Financing Administration (HCFA) that 
followed can be explained trom the perspective of resource dependency_ SpeciflcaUy, the 
proposed legislation and other indications of congressional support informally communicated 
demands hy Congress that the Health Care Finllllcing Administrat ion (HCFA) reevaluate the 
interpretation or the requirements of reform comnlllnicateci in the proposed mle. In turn, the 
Health Care Financing Administmtion (HeFA), aware that: a) nil critical resources were 
obtained from Congress, b) that Congress had total discretion over funding allocation and 
appropriation, and c) tim! there were 110 alternatives for obtnining cri ticnl funding responded 
through adaptation by seek ing the compromises described in the institutional portion of this 
analysis 
142 
3. O,·g:mi7.!ltional Pexfonn:mce 
From the resource dependency perspective. one of the most prominent indicators of 
the success of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) in accommodating the 
infom1ai congressional demands WIIS that forrnal legislative direction regarding the proposed 
rule was never realized. In this context it is app~rent that Congress, as a cl ient of the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA). wa~ ~atisfied with the revision in the Health Care 
Financing Administration'~ (HCFA) interpretation and that additional direction was not 
reguired in order for payment reform to be implemented liS intended 
Finally, as discussed in previo:ls ch?ptcrs ?nd in the institutional por1ion of this 
analysis. the special in teres t grOll)l~ also IIppeared to have been satisfied by the compromises 
and promises offered by Ihe Health Ca l-e Fin?ncing Ad ministratio n (HCFA). Satisfaction on 
the part of the environment is embodied in the American lvledical Association's (AMA) 
statement that it WllS time to call off the war with the Health Care Fin?ncing Administration 
(HCFA) and that iegisl<ltive ?ssistance in resolving diffhences over the proposed nile WllS no 
longer necessary. (Medici ne lind Health, 11)02, [no p~.ge no. provided]) 
Institutiolllli fUld resource dependency theories have enh?nced the understanding of 
lhe Medicare Fee Schedule (MfS), its cvo luti(Hl, and its impiclnent ll tion Although no singic 
theory may be employed to gain a cOfllpi'ehensive understanding of the behavior of an 
organization. institutional and rcsource dependency h<lve otfered insight into factors that 
influenced the Dep1\11ment of Health and H\lman Servi(.:es (Dl-lJ--{S) in the implementation of 
physicilln payment reform 
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VI. SUMMARV, CONCLUSIOr-;S, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this work was to gain <\n lInderstanding of the formation and 
implementation of the objectives <lnd incentives of the \·1edicare Fee Schedule (MFS) as set 
forth in thc Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Aets (OBRAs) of 19S9 and 1990, Tht tools used 
to facilitate this examin<ltion wcre dr<\wn from the resource dependency and institutional 
theories. Spccific objectives of the analysis wer~, to : 
Chapter I provided a discllssion of tinancifll fin d demographic factors that influenced 
key decision makers in their consideration of the need for physician payment reform The 
chapter began by describing major Medicare component programs, with emphasis on 
Medicare Part B. the component most affected by pilyment reform Next. the pre-reform 
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environment was considered from the per~pective ofthe objectives and incentives provided 
by the Cu~tomar)'. Prcvailing and Reaso(]~b l e (CPR) payment methodology. Finally, factors 
external to the Medicare program th~t were inf1uencing the cost of physician care were 
con~idered 
Chapter 11 began with a brief description of the mechanics of the Current. Prevailing 
and Reasonable (CPR) mdhodology. Concepts and tenninology that applied to both the pre-
and post-payment reform environment were introduced and described. Next, the major 
payment refonTl mechani~ms required hy the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) 
of 1989 and 1990 were introduced. lheir objective~ identified and their interrelationships 
delineated 
In Chapter fl. emphasis was pl~ced on tile major programs that comprise the Medic~re 
Fee Schedule (MFS). Specitic~lly. the development and pu rpose of the Conversion Factor 
(CF), the Relative Value Scale (R VS). and the Geographic Adju~tment Factors (GAF) were 
addressed 
The final section of Chapter 11 included a detailed quantitative discussion of the 
manner in which the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS) would be u~ed to identify post-reform 
allowable charges for a given procedure. Additionally. the Medicare Volume Performance 
Standard (MVPS) and the Maximum Allowable Actual Charge (MAAC) were pre~ented on 
a qual itative as well as quantitative basis 
Chapler 111 introduced the resource rlependency and institution theories which were 
used to analyze the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS). Many of the primary components and 
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underlying principles associated with resource dependency and institutional theories wcre 
discussed as w!:ll as their similarities and ditrerences 
In Chapter IV the Depallment of Health ~nd Human Services (DHHS) was identified 
as the focal organization for the anlllys is_ The general properties of its organizational 
environment were described Specifical ly, the analysis proceeded by recognizing 
organizations that comprised the He(l lth (lnd Hllmall Services (IH-IS) environment at the time 
of physician payment reform following the recognition and modeling of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) environment, a chronology of physician payment reform 
wa~ pre.';ented that emphasized the interaction between the Department and its environmcnt 
during the development and irnplernentat ion of the Medicare Fcc Schedule (MFS) 
The scope of rhis thesis and the large number of organizations present in the 
organizat ional environment prech:ded the inclusion of all organizations in the analysis 
Consequently. a methodology was developed for identitying only those organizations that 
appeared to be most activc in physician payment reform for llse in the analysis. Once 
identified, the Departmcr.t of Health and Human Services (DI-IHS) ar.d the organizations 
active in its environment were mode ed and considercrl within the context of resou rce 
dependency and institutional theory 
Chapter V contains the primary analysis or Ill<': Medicare Fcc Schedule (MFS ) In this 
chapter. issues ,!ssuciated with fee schedule formation anu implementation are addressed 
Specifically, the manner in whi ch the DePilllnlent ofl-lealth and Human Services (DHHS) 
intcracted with the American Medicill As,ociiltion (AM A), the Physician Paymcnt Review 
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Commission (PPRC). and Congress were l:onsidered fro m tile perspectives suggested by the 
institutional and resource dependency theorie, 
8 . CONCLUS ION S 
As demonst rated in the previous l:hapters, factors having an impact on health care 
refonn nre numerous and complex . These facto rs comprise a speCtrum that includes an aging 
population. rapid advances in tt:chnology, philosophicnl debate over hea lth care as an 
t:ntit lement and numerous other i ~~lIes F(ll' (;~ch (If t Ilese i~sl l es the l i te r ~ture indicates l h~l 
there are stakeholders actively competing to pro t ec~t or aCCluire the scarce resources involved 
in the provision of hea lth care T he researc h CQndu(;ted in support of this ana lysis indicated 
that for nearly every component in the hea lth care spectrum there was a correspond ing special 
interest group or groups As ind icated in C lwrte] rv t ile in terests represented by these 
g roups were diver~e and existed in ~ hyperr lura list ie state prior to the in troduct ion ort he 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) by the Hea lth CIlI"e Financing Administration 
(HeFA) 
It is th is spe(; tnnTI of 'reei~1 irllerest groups tha t cOillflrises t ile organizational 
environment for the Department of Ilealt il and 1III 111an Sel-Y i ce~ (DH HS) bOlh at tht: time of 
implementation of tile Medicare Fce Sched ille (MFS) ,ln t! ~t the plesent One of the single 
most impressive flu ali ties of thi~ enVinlllincllt was the degree to which it appeared to be 
fractured prior the publishing of th t: Not ice of Proposed Ruic Making (NPRM). The sector 
represent ing medical special interest groups piClvides an examp le of the depth of the 
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fracturing orlhe Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) environment in two 
ways 
First, as illustrated in Chapter IV, the environmental complexity was illustrated in part 
by the shcer quantity of groups repn::senting the interests of various physician specialties (e.g 
American Medical Association (AMA), American Society of Internal Medicine (AS 1M), 
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP), and Aillci-ican College of Cardiology 
(ACe». Second, the environment was rendered more complex because oflhe potential for 
group members to pursue interests by holcEng memberships in multiple organizations The 
number of possible combinations ofindividllals lind organizations that results increases the 
potential number of unique posit ions That may be IJI'esent in the environment. There are 
numerous examples in the literatu re of disagreements and dissension among organizations 
present in the environment and few example~ of coali tions presenting a united position on 
payment reform before the Department of Heahll and Human Services (DI-{HS), Congress, 
or the Physician Payment Review Coml\lig~ion (PPRC). It appears that this property of the 
environment had an impact on the weight that the Department ofI-Iealth and Human Services 
(DI-IHS) placed on it, linkage to Congre~s relative to that which it had with other 
organizations 
The publishing of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) appears to have 
provided the stimulus needed to turn a tract llrcd Depan ment of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) environment into one that wa~ relatively lIlliltd against the intended implementation 
of the rule. Furthermore, the inflexibility of the Department regarding other interpretations 
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ofthc congressional requirements for physician paymcnt reform only served to increase the 
strength of opposition coalitions. As a result of being unable to engage in a dialog with thc 
Departmcnt that might result in some form of compromise, il appears that organizations in 
the environmcnt turned to other means ofinflllencing the outcome of the reform, ie., appeal 
to Congress. 
Organi;o:alions, such as the American Medical Association (AMA), apparenlly 
concluded that their only opportunity for convincing the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHlIS) 10 revise the contents of the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPIUvl) 
prior to implementation was to win congressional support for the Association's positioos 
By winning congressional support, medical special interests were able to have an impact on 
the only hnkage to which the Department was responding, that which existed with Congress 
The strateb'Y Ih:ll emerged for obtaining congressional support had two clemcnts. The 
first element involved a direct lobbying effort betwecn key members of the American Mcdical 
AssQ(.:iation (AMA) and members of Congress Though the lobbying effort contributed to 
the winning congressional suppOl1, it appears that il was the second strategic clement that 
allowed for the support to be obt:lined in a relatively short period of time 
The second clement of this strategy recognized the influence oflhe Physician Payment 
Review Commission (PPRC) on congressional health care policy. Members of Congress have 
opcnly admitted to their relillnce on lhe Physicilln Payment Review Commission (PPRC) for 
guidance on health care reform issues By winning suppon for their positions with the 
Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC), in conceIt with their direct congressional 
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lobbying effort, the American Medi<.:al Association (M1A) was able to induce the Depanment 
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for them to reeval\late many of the positions 
described in the Not ice of Proposed RIlle Making (NPRM) 
The inllexibility that has been attributed to the Department of Health and Human 
Servi<.:es (DHHS) in much of the literature docs not appear to have been arbitrary or 
<.:apri<.:ious. Instead, it appears that the Department was under significant pressure from 
Congress to implement physi<.:ian payment reform relatively quickly. The complexity of the 
task , the need for legitimacy in its approach. tile inherently political environment and the 
mandated two year period that existed from legislation 10 implementation left the Department 
of Health and Human Services (DHl-IS) with little llexibility for Department to deviate from 
its criti<.:al path. To generate it proposed rule that would tind favor with the large number of 
diverse organizations in the Administration's envirc>nment was, ir. retrospect. an ambitious 
task . Still, what is remarkable is that the Dep;mment of Health and Human Services (DJ-iHS) 
constlUcted a proposed rule that res\llted in sl Ie h broad opposition within a hyperpluralistic 
environment 
The absence of evidence Ihat the llepanment s('lIgbt clarification of the requ irements 
of the Omnibus Budget Rewnciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 191:\9 and 1990 from Congress prior 
to issuing the proposed mle suggests one explanat ion for the genemtion of opposition to the 
Notice of Proposed Rule Making ( NPRM). l n~tead of resolving uncenainty by consulting 
Congress, the Department remained cOlTImitted to its interpretation of the congressional 
mandate while remaining relatively unresponsive to the opinions expressed by organizations 
lS I 
in the environment. An approach that might precludc similar occurrences for the Oepartment 
in the future would be to more actively involve the writers of policy, members of Congress 
and their staff, in validating thc Department's interpretation of a mandate prior to its 
impkmentation. 
Finally, in rescarching this issue no ins tances of Department of Hcalth and Human 
Sl.-rvices (DHHS)coalition building to support the proposed nile were encountered . Similarly, 
there is no evidence in the literature of a champion in Congress that defended the proposed 
implementation of the requirements of physici~n reform against critics To the contrary. 
individuals that had a hist01Y of opposit ion 10 the agendas of organizations such as the 
American Medical Association (AN1A). slich as Representative Stark, were persuaded to join 
in opposition to the proposed rule. The Oepm1mcilt may be ~ble to avoid similar responses 
in the future by considering the pot ential impact of support or opposition by key decision 
makers during the development and implernentMion of proposed policy 
c. RECOMMENDATtONS FURnlER HESEARCfI 
Allhough the institutional and resource dependency theories provide useful insight 
into the manner in which physician payment reform was conceived and implemented, they do 
not provided a comprehensive pictu l'e of the refon)), The following general topics Illay 
provide other avenues for gaining an understnnding of physician payment reform' 
1<;2 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1989 and the issuance of the 
Notice ofPropo~ed Rule Making (~; PRM) 
and other relevant organizations 
reqlllrements 
the interaction between the 
Services during the period 
Reconcil iation Act COBRA) of 
Rule Making (NPRM) 
• Select an organization from the DeP;lrtment of Health and Human Services' 
(DHHS) environment such as tile American Medical Association or AFL·CIO 
perspeC!tve 
• Identify and analyze the l11ethodology used by the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) to determine the valLles for the Conversion Factor (CF), 
the Relative Value Scale (RVS) and the Geographic Adjustment Factors (GArs) 
153 
that were published in the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM). Consider 
the extent to which the usc of assumptions and proxy data by the Health Care 
Finan(;ing Administration (HCFA) may have been influenced by the length of the 
implementation period . 
• Differeotiate physician payment reforlll aCtions mandated by the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of J 989 and 1990 from those for which the Health 
Care financing Administration (HeFA) was given discretion. Using organizational 
behavior theory consider the congressional decision making pro(;ess that 
determined the degree of lati tllde that was afforded the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) in the illlplementation of physician payment reform 
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of Chicago Press, Chicago and London , 1(9) 
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APPEN DIX . ENVIRONMENTAL ACfIVlTY STATISTICS 
Interest Group Frequency % of Interest Group Frequency %of 
Total Total 
ArnericanAcademy 20 1.37% The8rookings 0,07% 
of Family Physicians Institution 
American Academy I 007% The Urban Institute 0.55% 
of Opthalmology 
American Academy l 0.20% Health Industry 0.20% 
of Pediatrics Manufacturers 
Association 
American College I I 07S% Nonprescrip tion 0.14% 
of Cardiol ogy Drug Manufacturers 
Association 
American College )0 2.05% Pharmaceutical 0.07% 
of Physicians Manufacturers 
Association 
American College 1 0.48% The Commonwealth 4 0 .27% 
of Radiology Fund 
American College J) 0,80% The Henry J Kaiser ) 0.20% 
of Surgeons Family Foundation 
American Medical 294 20,07% The Robel1 Wood 0,14% 
Association lohnson Foundation 
American Nurses 041% AFL-CIO 22 1.50% 
Association 
American Society of I 0.07% Business Roundlllble 5 0.34% 
Anesthesiologist s 
American Society of 4. :1. 14% COllncilon 0 ,20% 
Internal Medicine Competitiveness 
Physicians fora 0 14% Chryslel 0.07% 
National Health Corporation 
Program 
17) 
Interest Group Frequency %of Interest Group Frequency %of 
Total Total 
American Hospital 45 ],07% I'Ie~lth Care Equity 0 ,14% 
Association Action League 
Catholic Health 0 ,07% National Associat ion 24 1.64% 
Association of Manufacturers 
Federation of 0.14% National Commitlee 1 0 ,07% 
American Health for Quali ty Health 
Systems Care 
American 30 2.05% National Federation 0 ,]4% 
Association of of Independent 
Retired Persons Business 
Citizen Action 0 .27% National 0 .]4% 
~~;~i~~~~rln 
Consu mers Union 0.14% National Small 0 .07% 
Business United 
Families USA 0.14% 
I ~~~;~',~'~' 0,61% 
Healt h 
Health Access 13 0,g9% General Accounting 18 1.2]% 
Office 
Public Citizen 007% CenSLIsBureau 0 ,20% 
Health Research 
Group 
Health Insurance 21 1.43% Offic!;":of 0 ,27% 
Association of Techno logy 
America Asse~sment 
Blue Cross Blue 014% Congressional 0,61% 
Shield Budget Office 
American Managed 0,07% Halls!;": Energy and 0.34% 
Care and Review Comm!;":rce 





















Rand Corporation 1 1 
Number of Hits by 597 
Column 
~~t~al Number of I 
%of 
Total 
Interest Group I Frequency 
0.27% I-Iollse Committee 80 
on Ways and l\·1eans 
0 ,1 '1% Senate Labor and 
Hliman Resources 
Committee 
0.20% Senate Finance 
Committee 
020"/0 
0.27% Democrat ic Pany 
24 
38 
0 .34% Republican Party 1 33 
0,14% 
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I N I T IA L DI STRIB UTION LI ST 
Defense Technical Information Center 
sns John J . Kingman Rd ., STE 0944 
Ft . Belvoir , Virginia 22060-62l8 
Library, Code l3 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5 10 I 
Professor Richard B Doyle 
Code SMlDy 
Department of Systems M~nagemel1l 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey. California 9394}-~I03 
Professor Kenneth J Euske 
Code SM/Ee 
Department of Systems Man~gemen1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 9)943-5103 
LCDR Michael Lipski ( [ C. USN 
9 14 Latil Street 
Long Beach, Mississippi ]9560 
Mr. and Mrs. John E. Lipski 
914 Latil Street 
Long Beach. Mississippi J9560 
Mr. and Mrs_ Max Wiltzius 
Matthews Lake Route I 
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